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CHAPTER 765 REVISITED: FLORIDA'S NEW ADVANCE
DIRECTIVES LAW
META CALDER*
Dying is personal. And it is profound. For many, the thought of an
ignoble end, steeped in decay, is abhorrent. A quiet, proud death,
bodily integrity intact, is a matter of extreme consequence.I
D URING the 1992 session, the Florida Legislature again revisited
its approach to the regulation of substituted health care decision
making for incapacitated patients, including the decision not to ad-
minister life-prolonging procedures to terminally ill patients. This was
the result of several events, including the September 1990 decision by
the Florida Supreme Court in In re Guardianship of Browning.2 This
Article seeks to trace the evolution of the 1992 statute by chronologi-
cally examining the interplay between the Florida court decisions that
recognize a fundamental individual right to control medical treatment
decisions and the legislative response to those decisions. It does not
seek to critically analyze legalistic, philosophic, or ethical doctrines
except to examine how judicial perspectives and statutory law play out
against each other.
Florida is unique in that, in 1969, it was the first state to attempt
"death with dignity" legislation.3 However, that early initiative was
lost and it was not until 1984 that the state finally passed the Life-
Prolonging Procedure Act.4 This was four years after the Florida Su-
preme Court recognized a constitutionally based privacy right of self-
determination over health care decisions in Satz v. Perlmutter,' and
only days before the court issued its opinion in John F. Kennedy
* Staff Attorney, Committee on Health Care, Florida House of Representatives; B.A.,
1972, Florida Atlantic University; J.D., 1991, Florida State University.
The author wishes to extend special thanks to Warren Wilson, Legislative Intern, 1991-92, and
Mike Hansen, Staff Director, Committee on Health Care, Florida House of Representatives.
1. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2868 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
2. 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
3. See Ronald P. Kaplan, Euthanasia Legislation: A Survey and a Model Act, 2 AM. J.L.
& MaD. 41, 54 (1976).
4. Ch. 84-58, 1984 Fla. Laws 136 (codified at FLA. STAT. ch. 765 (Supp. 1984)).
5. 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
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Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Bludworth,6 extending that right to incom-
petent, as well as competent, persons. Following the passage of the
Life-Prolonging Procedure Act, the Legislature then spent more than
half a decade debating whether the right to refuse life-prolonging
treatment also applied to the administration of artificial sustenance.,
The Florida Supreme Court's 1990 opinion in Browning made clear
that artificial nutrition and hydration could be refused along with all
other medical treatment.' The 1992 legislation, incorporating all forms
of advance directives in a single chapter, 9 is in many ways a significant
advance; however, it still trails the judicial vision and will require fur-
ther refinement.
I. FLORIDA BEFORE BRzOWNING
Florida began its odyssey with "right to die" legislation in the late
sixties. Given the existing social milieu that prided itself on question-
ing social taboos and championing the individual over entrenched in-
stitutional values, it would be expected that the explosion in medical
technology and the questionable practice and cost of prolonging life
past the point of meaningful existence would lead to a renewed inter-
est in euthanasia and patient's rights.'0 Missing was the firm legal ra-
tionale that allowed both the medical profession and the courts to
permit what was logically the only merciful alternative in hopeless si-
tuations-allowing the patient to die naturally. Legal, medical, and
ethical writers became immersed in the process of evolving a rationale
for permitting physicians, in certain defined circumstances, to allow
their patients to die without doing everything medically possible."
By the 1950s, the Catholic church had begun to differentiate be-
tween "ordinary" and "extraordinary"' ' 2 means of prolonging life,
6. 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984). House Bill 127 passed both the House and Senate on May
17, 1984, and was signed by the Governor on May 29, 1984. Bludworth was handed down on
May 25, 1984.
7. See infra Part I.D.
8. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 11 n.6 (Fla. 1990).
9. Ch. 92-199, 1992 Fla. Laws 1839 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. ch. 765; amending FLA.
STAT. § 709.08; repealing FLA. STAT. ch. 745).
10. See generally DEREK HuMmtiY & ANN WICxKTr, THE RiGrr TO DEa 63-90 (1986).
11. Id.; see also Howard W. Brill, Note, Death with Dignity: A Recommendation for Stat-
utory Change, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 368 (1970) (sorting out the ethical/legal arguments).
12. This distinction has been significant in the development of a procedure for permitting
the withdrawal of medical treatment in hopeless cases. See Sheryl L. Havens, Comment, In re
Living Will, 5 NOVA L.J. 445, 452-54 (1981) (discussing this distinction). Havens writes: "Ordi-
nary treatment is usually described as treatment that offers a reasonable benefit without exces-
sive pain, expense or inconvenience. Extraordinary treatment is treatment that offers no
reasonable benefit and cannot be used without excessive pain, expense or inconvenience." Id. at
19921
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finding the latter not morally obligatory. 3 The medical profession was
still resistant; physicians were reluctant to surrender their established
domain over such decisions. They argued that such choices should be
left where they were-safely in the hands of those who knew best. 4
The problem was that the decisions were not always made, or they
were made inconsistently, based either on the physician's fear of lia-
bility or on the physician's personal views of a doctor's duty to keep
patients alive, rather than on the patient's decision to forego extraor-
dinary treatment when the prognosis was obviously hopeless." There
was something fundamentally wrong about surrendering personal con-
trol over what is really a person's last great adventure, thus denying
the individual the opportunity to face his or her final act with dignity.
A. Representative Walter Sackett and the Right To Die with Dignity
Florida's struggle with "right to die" legislation started where it fi-
nally ended, in the Florida Constitution. 16 Then-Representative Walter
W. Sackett,' 7 a physician and surgeon from Miami, led the state's-
and the country's-first stabs at legislation permitting terminally ill
patients to forego the technological advances of modern medicine.
This came in the late 1960s in the form of a proposed amendment that
added a right "to be permitted to die with dignity" to the enumerated
452 n.17. Naturally, what is ordinary or extraordinary will vary from patient to patient and as
medical science progresses. Id. at 454. See also In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 667-68 (N.J. 1976);
Kaplan, supra note 3, at 51, 61-63, 83-86.
In recent years this distinction has largely been abandoned. See PRESIDENT'S CO M'N FOR THE
STury oF ETmcAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHWAvsioR RESEARCH, DEcID-
ING To FOREGO LIFE-SusTAINING TREATMENT: A REPORT ON THE ErmcAL MEDICAL, AND LEGAL
IssuEs IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 82-89 (1983) [hereinafter PRESIENr'S Comm'N]. The Florida
Supreme Court abandoned the distinction in In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 11
n.6 (Fla. 1990).
13. See Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 658, for a discussion of Pope Pius's address to anesthesiolo-
gists on November 24, 1957. See also Havens, supra note 12, at 453 n.25; Pius Gives View on
Saving Dying; Tells When Doctors May Give Up, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1957, at Al, A20.
14. See, e.g., Recommendations of the Judicial Council, Adopted by the House of Dele-
gates of the American Medical Association, 1973; Ad Hoc Comm. of Harvard Med. Sch., A
Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J.A.M.A. 337, 338 (1968); Franklin J. Evans, DWD Legis-
lation-It Really Isn't Necessary, 61 J. FLA. MED. Ass'N 363 (1974).
15. Compare Franklin H. Epstein, No. It's Our Duty To Keep Patients Alive, MED. ECON.,
Apr. 2, 1973, at 97 'with Walter W. Sackett, Jr., I've Let Hundreds of Patients Die. Shouldn't
You?, MED. EcoN., Apr. 2, 1973, at 92.
16. Ultimately, the Florida Supreme Court grounded the right to refuse medical treatment
in article I, § 23 of the Florida Constitution. See In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4,
10 (Fla. 1990).
17. Dem., Miami, 1966-1976, Representative Sackett developed a national reputation as a
pioneer in the area of "death with dignity" legislation.
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declaration of rights listed in article I, section 2 of the Florida Consti-
tution.is
Unable to move the resolution 9 out of committee, Sackett changed
tactics in 197020 by offering legislation 2' based on a legislatively recog-
nized right to "die with dignity." 22 Sackett's bill permitted any per-
son, with the same formalities required for the execution of a will, to
execute a document directing "that his life shall not be prolonged be-
yond the point of a meaningful existence." 23 To be effective, the doc-
ument was to be recorded with the clerk of the circuit court. In the
event the person was unable to make the decision, the choice could be
made by the spouse or immediate kin of the incapacitated patient, or,
if no kin was available, by three physicians with the approval of a
circuit judge, if the three physicians agreed that prolonging life was
meaningless.24 This was a distinctive and controversial aspect of Sack-
ett's bill because it meant that the patient might not have participated
in the decision to cease further medical treatment; thus, it theoreti-
cally allowed the withdrawal of life-prolonging treatment of the pro-
foundly handicapped, minors, and other incompetents if the family or
physicians concluded that continued life was pointless. 2
Although the 1970 bill died, it was offered again in 19711 and 1972. 27
18.
All natural persons are equal before the law and have inalienable rights, among which
are the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to be permitted to die with dignity,
to pursue happiness, to be rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess and protect
property; except that the ownership, inheritance, disposition, and possession of real
property by aliens ineligible for citizenship may be regulated or prohibited by law. No
person shall be deprived of any right because of race or religion.
Fla. HJR 91, § 1 (1969) (proposed FLA. CONST. art. I. § 2) (emphasis in original).
19. FLA. H.R. JouR. 1359 (Reg. Sess. 1969). The proposed constitutional amendment was
offered again in 1974 and 1976. Fla. HJR 3007 (1974) (proposed FLA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 2) and
Fla. HJR 2575 (1976) (proposed FLA. CONST. art. I. § 2).
House Joint Resolution 2575 (1976) (offered by Representatives Richard Hodes, Democrat,
Tampa, 1966-1984, and Sackett) also contained a series of "whereas" clauses that pointed out
that the extreme cost associated with uselessly prolonging life results in the inability to provide
needed systems to those who could be saved. HJR 2575 (1976) at 1.
20. Coincidently, this also followed Luis Kutner's revolutionary article, Due Process of Eu-
thanasia: The Living Will, A Proposal, 44 IND. L.J. 539 (1969), proposing a document, or living
will, that would express a person's desires about the administration of extraordinary medical
procedures that serve only to prolong the process of dying.
21. Fla. HB 3184 (1970). See Brill, supra note 11, for a discussion of Sackett's 1970 bill.
22. Fla. HB 3184 (1970).
23. Id. at 2.
24. Id. The 1971 and 1972 versions of the bill, introduced as House Bill 68 and House Bill
2614, respectively, deleted the provision requiring circuit judge approval.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 39-44.
26. Fla. HB 68(1971).
27. Fla. HB 2614 (1972). Representative Sackett also offered a resolution in 1972, Florida
19921
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In 1972 a committee substitute for Sackett's bill was placed on the calen-
dar.'$ The committee substitute contained the first definition of "termi-
nal. '"" In addition, the power to execute a document was restricted to
persons eighteen or older who had been declared terminally ill by two
physicians." The document could only be acted upon if the person had
been adjudged incompetent by a court. 3' The provision permitting the
immediate family or three physicians to make the decision was re-
moved." Immunity from liability for physicians acting in good faith and
without negligence, when they relied on such documents, was added.33
Persons who participated in the execution of the document were deemed
not to be assisting another in committing suicide.14 Finally, a provision
was added establishing a revocation procedure.15
Sackett came closest to success in 1973 when Florida House Bill
40736 passed the House. The bill retained all the provisions of the 1972
bill except the requirement that a court adjudicate a person incompe-
tent .7 Representative Sackett continued to offer "death with dignity
House Resolution 2830, which proposed that then-Governor Askew create a commission to
study and make recommendations concerning various issues related to the process of death: a
definition of death, intrauterine death, euthanasia, death with dignity, capital punishment, and
suicide. The resolution died in committee. FLA. LEaIs., HISTORY OF LEOISLATION, 1972 REaGUAR
SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 180, HR 2830.
28. Fla. CS for HB 2614 (1972). House Bill 2614 ultimately died on calendar. FLA. LaoGis.,
HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1972 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 139, HB 2614.
29. "As used in this act terminal illness means any illness that would result in natural expi-
ration of life regardless of the use or discontinuance of medical treatment to sustain the life
processes." Fla. CS for HB 2614 § 1 (1972). This definition was extremely narrow and would not
have permitted the withdrawal of treatment from a person such as Karen Ann Quinlan or Nancy
Cruzan whose life could be indefinitely sustained through the administration of artificial life-
sustaining procedures. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990); In
re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
30. Fla. CS for HB 2614 (1972).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. Two people had to witness the revocation.
36. Fla. HB 407 (1973). An amended version of House Bill 407 was passed by the House
and was referred to the Senate Committee on Judiciary, where it remained upon adjournment. A
companion bill, Senate Bill 253 (1973), was filed by Senator Ralph Poston, Democrat, Miami,
1966-1978. Reported favorably with amendment by the Senate Committee on Health and Reha-
bilitative Services, it died on calendar. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1973 REoULAR
SESSION. HISTORY OF SENATE BIS at 72, SB 253. As of 1975, this was the only bill of this type in
the country to have passed an entire branch of the Legislature. Kaplan, supra note 3, at 56.
37. In addition, for the first time Sackett's bill did not include the provision basing the
legislation on a right to die with dignity.
Although the original bill filed in 1973 revived the 1970 provision permitting the immediate
family or three physicians to make the decision in the event the terminally ill person was unable
to execute a document directing that medical treatment be discontinued, this addition was
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bills" through 1976, when he left the Legislature. 8 Because Represen-
tative Sackett's vision included discontinuing the medical treatment of
the severely handicapped, as well as the terminally ill,19 his pioneering
attempts to adopt "death with dignity" legislation were strongly re-
sisted by the Florida Association of Retarded Citizens, 40 the Florida
Catholic Conference, 4' and the Florida Medical Association. 42 This
conflict highlighted one of the most serious defects in these early legis-
lative attempts. Sackett's bills could have permitted the patient's fam-
ily or physician to conclude that a patient's life was not worth living
in the absence of the individual's express direction. 43 It was therefore
conceptually difficult to avoid fears that decisions to withdraw treat-
ment would be based on a belief that a person would be better off
dead, rather than based on the individual's choice to forego further
amended out on the floor and was not included in the version sent to the Senate. FLA. H.R.
JouR. 580 (Reg. Sess. 1973).
38. Florida House Bill 239 (1975) and Florida House Bill 3703 (1976) each contained a new
provision guaranteeing immunity to medical facilities as well as to physicians who participated in
the execution of a document directing that medical treatment be discontinued. The provisions
required that the person executing a document be at least 18 years old and terminally ill, stated
that cooperation did not imply facilitation of suicide, and included a procedure for revocation.
Senate Bill 513 (1976), an identical companion bill to House Bill 3703, was filed by Senator
Julian Lane, Democrat, Tampa, 1967-1976.
An identical bill, Florida House Bill 374, was offered in 1977 by Representative Donald Hazel-
ton, Democrat, West Palm Beach, 1970-1978. Hazelton briefly took up the gauntlet after Sackett
left the House.
Representative Hazelton offered an altered version of Sackett's bill in 1978, Florida House Bill
8, which included a "declaration" form to be filed with the clerk of the county at least 30 days
before the cessation of extraordinary treatment. Interestingly, the request to withdraw life-sus-
taining mechanisms was tied to "extensive brain damage." Id. Also included for the first time
was a provision providing that the making and carrying out of a directive would not impair the
terms of an existing life insurance policy. Id.
39. See Hearings Before the Special Committee on Aging, United States Senate, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 30 (1972); EUGENE F. DIAMOND, DEATH, Dymo, AND EUtHANASIA 131-33 (Dennis J.
Haran & David Mall eds., 1981) (discussion of Sackett's testimony); Walter W. Sackett, Jr.,
Euthanasia: Why No Legislation?, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 3, 5 (1975); Lawmaker Says Mail Favors
'Death with Dignity', FLA. TtEaS-UNIoN, Jan. 11, 1973, at B2; Walter W. Sackett, Jr., Death
with Dignity, 64 S. MED. J. 330 (1971).
40. See, e.g., Memorandum from Catherine Real on Behalf of Mr. Robert Battermann and
the Martin County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens to Fla. S. in opposition to Fla. SB 253 (1973),
companion to Fla. HB 407 (1973) (Apr. 30, 1973) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of
Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.); FLA. H.R. JOUR. 580-82 (Reg. Sess. 1973) (proposed amendments
excluding retarded persons from the provisions of House Bill 407); DAkmOND, supra note 39
(contains text of a resolution of Florida Association for Retarded Citizens dated September 15,
1973, condemning Sackett's bill).
41. See Bridget A. Berry, Comment, The Right To Die: Florida Breaks Through Legal
Deadlock, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 607, 630 (1984).
42. See Recommendations of the Judicial Council, supra note 14; Evans, supra note 14.
43. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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treatment. The future judicial doctrine of substituted judgment, even
with all of its flaws, served the important function of placing the locus
of decision making within the individual rather than in the state, fam-
ily, or public opinion.-
Also missing in these bills and resolutions was a legal or constitu-
tional rationale recognizing a personal right to control medical treat-
ment decisions in terminal situations. Without that support, the
ability to enforce a person's desire that life-sustaining procedures not
be administered-versus the opposing interests of the state or fam-
ily-was left in doubt. Subsequent court proceedings that placed deci-
sions to forego life-prolonging procedures within the domain of the
constitutional right to privacy and/or the common law doctrine re-
quiring "informed consent" to medical treatment provided that legiti-
macy.41
B. Quinlan, Saikewicz, Perlmutter, and California
On March 31, 1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided In re
Quinlan.46 For the first time, a state supreme court based the right to
forego extraordinary life-prolonging procedures on a constitutionally
based right to privacy.47 The court recognized that although the State
had an interest in "the preservation and sanctity of human life and
defense of the right of the physician to administer medical treatment
according to his best judgment," the State's interest "weakens and
the individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion
increases and the prognosis dims." 49
Remarkably, the court held that because of the inability to discern
Karen Quinlan's choice in whether to disconnect her respirator, that
44. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4. 13 (Fla. 1990).
45. See infra notes 46-137 and accompanying text.
46. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). Karen Ann Quinlan was left in a chronic persistent vegetative
state from using a combination of drugs and alcohol. Assured that there was no hope of her
recovering competency, her father, Joseph Quinlan, a devout Catholic, sought to be appointed
Karen's guardian with the express power to authorize the discontinuance of all extraordinary
medical procedures. Id. at 653-56.
47. While the United States Supreme Court had recognized an individual privacy right with
regard to contraception, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and abortion, Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), this was the first time a court directly associated the privacy right
with a terminally ill person's decision to be allowed to die naturally. For a more thorough dis-
cussion of the evolution of the constitutional right to privacy in "right to die" cases see Devel-
opments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, VI. The Right To Refuse Medical
Treatment, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1643, 1661-76 (1990) [hereinafter Right To Refuse].
48. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663.
49. Id. at 664.
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right could be "asserted in her behalf by her guardian." 50 The court
reasoned that if the decision to terminate a noncognitive, vegetative
existence "is regarded as a valuable incident of her right of privacy
... then it should not be discarded solely on the basis that her condi-
tion prevents her conscious exercise of the choice."'" Thus, the only
way to prevent the destruction of the right "is to permit the guardian
and family of Karen to render their best judgment . . . as to whether
she would exercise it in these circumstances."" The court explained
that this decision should be accepted by society because the over-
whelming majority "would . . . in similar circumstances, exercise such
a choice in the same way for themselves or for those closest to
them." 3 Finally, the court directed that such decisions should be kept
within the patient-doctor-family relationship, subject to review by a
hospital "ethics committee" or the like, rather than requiring a cum-
bersome court procedure."
A year and a half later, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
held in Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz" that
a court-appointed guardian with the authority to make health care de-
cisions for a ward of the state could decide to forego chemotherapy
treatments for a terminally ill and profoundly retarded patient. Jo-
seph Saikewicz, an elderly, longtime resident of a state facility, was
suffering from leukemia. It had been estimated that, even with the
administration of chemotherapy, an uncomfortable and frightening
procedure, Mr. Saikewicz would at best live an additional year.5 6
Elaborating on Quinlan, the Saikewicz court held that there is both a
common-law right to be free from a nonconsensual bodily invasion,
as expressed in the doctrine of "informed consent," 57 and a constitu-
tional recognition of a right of privacy that permits a person to refuse
unwanted medical treatment."' The court held that this right extended
50. Id.; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AmmcRAN CosTrruTioNAL LAW § 15-11, at 1368
n.25 (2d ed. 1988) (questioning whether someone who is irreversibly comatose has constitutional
rights).
51. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 668-69.
55. 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
56. Id. at 420-21.
57. Id. at 424. Emerging from the law of medical malpractice, the doctrine of "informed
consent" holds that every adult of sound mind has the right to determine what should be done
with his or her own body. Thus, he or she would have the right to agree to refuse medical
treatment. See Luis Kutner, Euthanasia: Due Process for Death with Dignity; The Living Will,
54 IND. L.J. 201, 206-20 (1979).
58. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 424.
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to an "incompetent, as well as a competent, patient because the value
of human dignity extends to both." 9
The court then explored the doctrine of "substituted judgment" as
a means of exercising an incompetent's right to make decisions
affecting his bodily integrity. 60 The test is essentially subjective, al-
though the court recognized that it could be difficult to avoid apply-
ing an objective reasonable person standard in cases where the person
had never been competent. The decision maker must make the deci-
sion that the patient, if competent, would choose if the patient imag-
ined him- or herself incompetent in that manner.6'
Significantly, the court elaborated upon the State's interests that
may overcome this individual right: 62 (1) the preservation of life; (2)
the protection of the interests of innocent third parties; (3) the preven-
tion of suicide;(3 and (4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the medi-
cal profession." These four interests have become the standard against
which most state courts, including Florida's, measure the individual's
privacy decision to decline life-prolonging procedures. Unlike Quin-
lan, the Saikewicz court rejected "entrusting the decision whether to
continue artificial life support to the patient's guardian, family, at-
tending doctors, and hospital 'ethics committee."' 6 The court did not
view the judicial resolution of such decisions as representing a gratui-
tous encroachment on the domain of the medical profession. Instead,
59. Id. at 427.
60. Id. at 430-32. Although the doctrine of "substituted judgment" has been subject to
much criticism, see, e.g., Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine
of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. I (1990), it is still the most widely accepted judicial
standard. See Right To Refuse, supra note 47, at 1646. The version presented in Saikewicz is the
most extreme form of the standard. Id. at 1648.
61. As the court stated:
In short, the decision in cases such as this should be that which would be made by the
incompetent person, if that person were competent, but taking into account the pres-
ent and future incompetency of the individual as one of the factors which would nec-
essarily enter into the decision-making process of the competent person.
Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E. 2d 417, 431 (Mass. 1977).
The court concluded that if Mr. Saikewicz were suddenly competent and had to decide what
he would do if he were incompetent he would decide to forego chemotherapy under the circum-
stances. Id.
62. Id. at 425.
63. Some have argued that this interest is incorporated within the state's more general inter-
est in the preservation of life. See Right To Refuse, supra note 47, at 1668.
64. Whether the state has an obligation to protect the "ethical integrity of the medical pro-
fession" has been questioned. Even if it could be argued that the state has such an interest, it
would mean that the patient's choice is subservient to medical judgment. See Robert M. Byrn,
Compulsory Lifesaving Treatment for the Competent Adult, 44 FORDHA4M L. REV. 1, 29-33
(1975). But see Right To Refuse, supra note 47, at 1669 (arguing that society has an interest in
maintaining the integrity of the profession).
65. 370 N.E.2d at 434.
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the court concluded that the detachment of the judicial branch was
needed to make the kind of decisions called for in these circum-
stances .66
Less than a year later, in Satz v. Perlmutter, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal handed down the first Florida appellate decision ad-
dressing the termination of life-prolonging procedures for dying pa-
tients.6 7 The court held that Abe Perlmutter, a competent, terminally
ill, seventy-three-year-old man suffering from Lou Gehrig's disease,
had the right to direct that a mechanical respirator be removed even
though his death would result within an hour.61 After carefully review-
ing the four state interests presented in Saikewicz, the court concluded
that none were compelling enough to interfere with Mr. Perlmutter's
expressed desire to have his respirator removed. 69 The court refused to
wait for legislative action and postpone consideration of the right of a
person to discontinue life-prolonging procedures because these proce-
dures involved the patient's constitutional right of privacy. 70 However,
the court limited its holding to terminally ill competent patients. 7t
The Florida Supreme Court adopted the Fourth District Court's
opinion in 198072 with the caveat that it not reach beyond the facts of
the case. 73 The court made a special plea that, given the complexity of
the issue and the variety of interests, the Legislature address the
"death with dignity" issue. 74 Like the district court, the Florida Su-
preme Court observed that "[]egislative inaction cannot serve to close
the doors of the courtrooms of this state to its citizens who assert
cognizable constitutional rights. ' 75 The court warned that in the ab-
sence of legislative direction it would be obligated to proceed on a
66. Id. at 435.
67. 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (affirming Perlmutter v. Florida Medical Ctr., 47
Fla. Supp. 190 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. 1978), which directed that the hospital not interfere with Mr.
Perlmutter's exercise of the right of privacy).
68. Id. at 161-62.
69. Id. at 162-64.
70. Id. at 164. The court noted that the Legislature had failed to adopt suitable legislation
despite more than a dozen attempts. Id.
71. Id. at 162. For further discussion of Perlmutter see Linda N. Flewellen, Comment,
Criminal Law: Who Will Decide When a Patient May Die? Satz v. Perlmutter, 32 U. FLA. L.
REv. 808 (1980); Michael T. Hand & F. Brandon Chapman, Note, Death with Dignity and the
Terminally Ill: The Need for Legislative Action-Satz v. Perlmutter, 4 NOVA L.J. 257 (1980);
Rosemary O'Shea, Note, Florida's Right To Die-A Question of Litigation or Legislation? Satz
v. Perlmutter, 8 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. Ill (1980); Joseph D. Wasil, Note, Satz v. Perlmutter: A
Constitutional Right To Die?, 35 U. Mmai L. REV. 377 (1981).
72. Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
73. Id. at 360.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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case-by-case basis.!6 Despite such pleas, it would be four more years
before the Legislature would finally enact legislation.77
Before the Quinlan decision, right-to-die legislation had been intro-
duced in only five states, including Florida. 78 After Quinlan, seventeen
such bills were introduced. 79 By 1978 eight states had enacted right-to-
die legislation.A0 The first state to pass such a bill was California."'
Not surprisingly, California's legislation became the model for a new
legislative initiative in Florida. Introduced by Florida Representatives
Roberta Fox 2 and Virginia Rosen 3 in 1979," 1980,5 1981,6 and
1982,7 the "Natural Death Act" proposal was more comprehensive
than anything that had been presented during the Sackett era. Al-
though none of the bills became law, a review of the provisions high-
lights the evolution of key issues in Florida's long legislative
experience with attempts to enact statutory procedures for withhold-
ing life-prolonging procedures from terminally ill patients.
A definition section was added that included definitions for "life-
sustaining procedure"8s and "terminal condition."s9 The definitions
76. Id. at 361.
77. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
78. HUMPHRY & WicKETT, supra note 10, at 108.
79. Id.
80. Diane L. Redleaf et al., Note, The California Natural Death Act: An Empirical Study
of Physicians' Practices, 31 STA. L. REv. 913, 917 n.20 (1979) (Arkansas, California, Idaho,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, and Texas had passed legislation).
81. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West 1976).
82. Dem., Miami, 1976-1982. Fox also served in the Senate from 1982 to 1986.
83. Dem., North Miami Beach, 1978-1982.
84. Fla. HB 740 (1979). House Bill 740 died in committee. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGis-
LATION, 1979 REOULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BELLS at 178, HB 740.
85. Fla. HB 463 (1980). An identical Senate companion, Florida Senate Bill 446 (1980), was
introduced by Senator Paul Steinberg, Democrat, North Miami Beach, 1978-1982. Senate Bill
446 was reported favorably by the Senate Committee on Health and Rehabilitative Services,
withdrawn from Senate Committee on Judiciary, but died in Florida Senate Committee on Rules
and Calendar. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1980 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE
BILLS at 131, SB 446.
86. Fla. HB 574 (1981). Asin 1980, a Senate companion, Senate Bill 149 (1981), identical to
the 1979 and 1980 House and Senate bills, was introduced by Senator Steinberg. However, it
died in Florida Senate Committee on Health and Rehabilitative Services. FLA. LEOIS., HISTORY
OF LEGISLATION, 1981 REoUAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE Bu.s at 53, SB 149.
87. Fla. HB 841 (1982). Only Representative Rosen sponsored the 1982 bill because Repre-
sentative Fox had been elected to the Florida Senate. As in 1980 and 1981, a Senate companion,
Florida Senate Bill 72 (1982), was introduced by Senator Steinberg. Reported unfavorably by
Senate Committee on Health and Rehabilitative Services, it died in committee. FLA. S. JoR. 328
(Reg. Sess. 1982).
No similar legislation was proposed in 1983.
88.
"Life-sustaining procedure" means any medical procedure or intervention which util-
izes mechanical or other artificial means to sustain, restore or supplant a vital func-
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and the "directive form" made it clear that the proposal would apply
only to situations where the patient was terminally ill9° and death was
imminent (or expected to occur), whether or not such procedures were
utilized. 9' A procedure for executing a directive was provided. 92 The
directive would be effective for five years93 and would be suspended if
the patient was found to be pregnant.94 The directive would be "con-
clusively presumed" to express the wishes of the patient if the patient
had been certified by two physicians to be afflicted with a terminal
condition prior to executing the directive. 9 However, there was no ob-
tion, which, when applied to a qualified patient, would serve only to artificially
prolong the moment of death when, in the judgment of the patient's attending physi-
cian, death is imminent whether or not such procedures are utilized. "Life-sustaining
procedure" shall not include the administration of medication or the performance of
any medical procedure deemed necessary to alleviate pain.
HB 740, § 2(3) (1979); HB 463, § 2(3) (1980).
Committee Substitute for House Bill 463 (1980) and House Bill 841 (1982) changed this defini-
tion slightly, replacing "imminent" with "will occur." The Committee Substitute for House Bill
574 (1981) substituted the words "likely to occur." This is only the first example of the problems
associated with the use of the word "imminent" in the context of right-to-die legislation.
The phrase "comfort care" was also added in 1980 as an exception to the definition of life-
sustaining procedures. CS for HB 463, § 2(3) (1980) ('Life-sustaining procedure' shall not in-
clude the administration of medication or the performance of any medical procedure deemed
necessary to provide comfort care, or to alleviate pain.") See also HB 574 (1981); HB 841
(1982).
House Bill 574 (1981) and House Bill 841 (1982) inserted the word "extraordinary" before
"life-sustaining."
89. "'Terminal condition' means an incurable condition caused by injury, disease, or ill-
ness, which, regardless of the application of life-sustaining procedures, would, within reasonable
medical judgment, produce death and when the application of life-sustaining procedures serves
only to postpone the moment of death of the patient." HB 740, § 2(6) (1979).
This definition was deleted from the 1980, 1981, and 1982 versions of the House bill. It re-
mained in the Senate bills, but in a modified form in the 1982 bill. Definitions were also included
for "attending physician," "directive," "physician," and "qualified patient." See id. § 2(1),
(2), (4), (5).
90. The definition of "qualified patient" was that a patient had been certified by two phy-
sicians to be terminally ill. Id. § 2(5).
91. This would have excluded coverage for those patients, such as Karen Ann Quinlan,
whose lives could be sustained indefinitely.
As at least one author has observed, the California legislation "might most accurately be de-
scribed as a broad declaration of a patient's right to stop treatment under very limited circum-
stances .... Redleaf et al., supra note 80, at 919.
92. Fla. HB 740, § 3 (1979). Only an adult could execute a directive. Id. § 3(l).
93. Id. § 6. This was revoked in the Committee Substitute for House Bill 463 (1980), but
reinstated in House Bill 574 (1981) and shortened to four years. House Bill 841 (1982) again
removed any restriction.
94. See Fla. HB 740, § 3(2)(c) (1979), and all subsequent versions of the bill.
95. Id. § 8(2). The California statute and the 1979 and 1980 House bills required the patient
to wait a minimum of 14 days. This was removed from the 1981 and 1982 bills.
Provisions taken from the California Act that declared that a directive executed before a per-
son became terminally ill could be considered by the physician merely "as evidence" of the
patient's wishes and not obligatory were amended out of the House bills in 1980.
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ligation for a physician to effectuate the directive,9 and there was no
provision for decision making in the absence of a directive. 7
Two other significant provisions were also included. First, the pro-
posal was to be cumulative. In other words, nothing in the proposal
could impair or supersede any legal right or responsibility that a per-
son may have with regard to the administration of life-sustaining pro-
cedures.9 8 Second, nothing in the proposal was to be construed to
permit mercy killing or any affirmative act that may end life, other
than to permit the natural process of dying.Y Thus, a distinction was
made between active and passive euthanasia. In addition, the proposal
included a mandatory directive form, I°0 a procedure for the revocation
of a directive, l0' a provision providing immunity from liability for
physicians acting in accordance with the directive, °'0 a suicide dis-
claimer, 03 a provision insuring that life insurance policies were not
compromised by either the execution or carrying out of a directive,'04
and a provision providing criminal penalties for any person who con-
ceals or falsifies the directive of another.105
96. Id. "No physician, and no licensed health care professional acting under the direction
of a physician, shall be criminally or civilly liable for failing to effectuate the directive of the
qualified patient pursuant to this subsection." Id.
A "transfer clause" in the California statute that attributed unprofessional conduct to a phy-
sician who fails to make arrangements for a qualified patient to be transferred to another physi-
cian who would effectuate the directive was deleted in the Committee Substitute for House Bill
463 (1980). Although the clause was put back in House Bill 574 (1981), it was again amended out
in committee. It was included in Senate Bill 72 (1982).
Interestingly, in 1982, Senate Bill 326, introduced by Senator Don Childers, Democrat, West
Palm Beach, 1974-1990, proposed to add a new subsection to chapter 395, Florida Statutes.
Section 395.0653 would have made clear that a physician's refusal to perform abortions or eu-
thanasia could not be used to deny the physician hospital staff membership or clinical privileges.
The bill passed the Senate unanimously but died in the Florida House Committee on Health and
Rehabilitative Services. FLA. LEoIS., HISTORY OF LEoISLATION, 1982 REOULAR SESSION, HISTORY
OF S NATE BILLS at 112, SB 326.
97. Except for a provision added to Committee Substitute for House Bill 463 § 7(4) in 1980
that provided that the act created "no presumption concerning the intention of an individual
who has not executed a declaration to consent to the use or withholding of life-sustaining proce-
dures in the event of a terminal condition."
98. Fla. HB 740, § 10 (1979), and subsequent versions of the bill.
99. Id. § 12.
100. Id. § 3. Part of the procedure included the requirement that the directive be signed in
the presence of two witnesses.
Section 4 of the bill added the crippling caveat that the directive would have no force or effect
if the declarant was a patient in a nursing home unless one of the witnesses was "a member of
the appropriate district nursing home ombudsman committee as provided in" § 400.307, Florida
Statutes. id. § 4.
101. Id.§5.
102. Id. § 7.
103. Id. § 9(l).
104. Id. § 9(2).
105. Id. § 11.
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Regrettably, Florida remained unable to move ahead in the area of
natural death legislation, despite the fact that by 1983 thirteen states
had enacted natural death acts '°6 and despite the pleas of the Florida
Supreme Court in Perlmutter. In 1983, however, after the Fourth Dis-
trict Court's decision in John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital, Inc. v.
Bludworth'07 raised the possibility that all decisions to withhold life-
support would have to be judicially reviewed, health care facilities,
seeking to avoid the expense of maintaining terminally ill patients in-
definitely, or, conversely, the need to obtain court approval for each
decision to withdraw treatment, placed increasing pressure on the Leg-
islature to provide a procedure for the recognition of living wills that
did not require judicial intervention.108
C. Section 23, Bludworth, Barry, and the Life-Prolonging
Procedure Act
In John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Bludworth, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal held that both incompetent and com-
petent terminally ill patients had the right to direct that artificial life-
sustaining procedures be removed. ' 9 In Bludworth the patient, Fran-
cis Landy, lapsed into a coma within a few days after being admitted
to a hospital. Landy's wife, who had been appointed guardian, asked
the hospital to remove all artificial life support on the basis of a "liv-
ing will" Landy executed in 1975.110
Given the holding in Perlmutter that recognized a competent per-
son's right to refuse medical treatment, the 4th DCA concluded that
the right to refuse medical treatment extended to the comatose pa-
tient."' As in Perlmutter, the court asserted that, given the'fundamen-
tal nature of the privacy right, it was duty-bound to implement that
right and the concomitant right to die with dignity despite the lack of
legislative action."' What concerned the court was how the right was
to be exercised when the patient was incompetent and what safeguards
would be required: a court-appointed guardian, the consensus of close
relatives, confirmation by a medical ethics committee, court review,
106. See Kimarie R. Stratos, Comment, Equal But Incompetent: Procedural Implementation
of a Terminally Ill Person's Right to Die, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 148, 168 nn. 156 & 161 (1984).
107. 432 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), rev'd in part, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984).
108. Fla. H.R. Comm. on HRS, Subcomm. on Health, Economic, & Social Servs., tape
recording of proceedings (Feb. 6, 1984) (testimony of Bill Bell, Fla. Hosp. Ass'n, supporting
passage of HB 127) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
109. 432 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), rev'd in part, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984).
110. Id. at 614.
111. ld.at618-19.
112. Id.
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or some combination?"' The court, concluding that the interests of a
comatose patient required greater scrutiny than those of a competent
patient, imposed the requirement that a guardian be appointed and
that any decision to withdraw life-prolonging procedures be reviewed
by a court in an expedited hearing." 4 A duly proved "living will"
would be admissible as evidence on the issue of the patient's present
intent." The court then certified this question to the Florida Supreme
Court:
In the case of a comatose and terminally ill individual who has
executed a so-called "living" or "mercy" will, it is [sic] necessary
that a court appointed guardian of this person obtain the approval of
a court of competent jurisdiction before terminating extraordinary
life support systems in order for consenting family members, the
attending physicians, and the hospital and its administrators to be
relieved of civil and criminal liability."6
Before the Florida Supreme Court's 1984 review of Bludworth, the
Second District Court of Appeal contributed another key piece to
Florida's evolving doctrine. In In re Guardianship of Barry,"7 the
court considered whether the parents of a severely handicapped and
terminally ill infant could direct that life support systems be removed
so that their child could be permitted to die naturally. Medical exami-
nation indicated that without the respirator, the child would die
within an hour, while he might live anywhere from one to five years
with the ventilator." 8
113. Id. at 612-20.
114. Id. at 619-20. The court also added the requirement that the comatose patient be certi-
fied in writing as "terminal" by two physicians. "Terminal condition" was defined as:
[A]n incurable physical state caused by injury, disease, or illness which, regardless of
the application of "life-sustaining procedures," would produce death with a reasona-
ble degree of medical probability, and where the application of life-sustaining proce-
dures serves only or primarily to postpone the moment of the patient's medico-legal
death.
Id. at 619.
"Life-sustaining procedures" were defined as:
[M]edical procedures which utilize mechanical or other artificial means to sustain, re-
store, or supplant a vital function, which serve only or primarily to prolong the mo-
ment of death, and where, in the judgment of the attending and consulting physicians,
as reflected in the patient's medical records, death is imminent if such procedures are
not utilized.
Id.
115. Id. at 620. For a well-written discussion of the pros and cons of judicial review of
decisions to withdraw life-support from incompetent patients, see Stratos, supra note 106.
116. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611, 620 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1983), rev'd in part, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984).
117. 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
118. Id.at370.
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After noting that Perlmutter failed to elicit a legislative response,
the Barry court observed that the 1980 adoption of article I, section 23
of the Florida Constitution provided an express right of privacy that
did not require a person to be competent to exercise that right." 9
Agreeing with the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Bludworth, the
Second District Court of Appeal also concluded that such right would
be empty if it did not extend to the incompetent as well as the compe-
tent.120 What remained problematic was the vehicle that permitted the
exercise of this right in the absence of evidence of the infant's intent.
To this effect the court examined the doctrine of "substituted judg-
ment." '1 2' As explained by the court, "[u]nder this doctrine the court
substitutes its judgment for what it finds the patient, if competent,
would have done."'' 2 However, because this case involved a child
rather than an adult, the decision of the parents, supported by medi-
cal evidence, needed to guide the court's order. 23 The court could en-
vision "no state interest great enough to compel the parents to
continue to submit their child to a life support system in this in-
stance."' 24 Unlike the Fourth District Court in Bludworth, the Second
District Court held that judicial review of decisions made within the
privacy of the family relationship and based on competent medical
advice was not necessary.125 However, when the family chose judicial
review, the court required "clear and convincing" evidence that the
child suffered from an irreversible defect from which there was no
reasonable medical probability of recovery. 126
119. Id. This was the first time a Florida court tied the right to refuse medical treatment to
the 1980 addition to the constitution. See FLA. CONST. art I, § 23 ("Right of Privacy.-Every
natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private
life except as otherwise provided herein .... ").
120. Barry, 445 So. 2d at 370 (discussing John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Blud-
worth, 432 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), revd in part, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984)).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 370-71.
123. Id. at 371. At a minimum, the court held that such diagnosis should be confirmed by at
least two physicians. Id. at 372.
124. Id. at 371. The evidentiary standard used here is closer to the In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d
647 (N.J. 1976), decision than to Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370
N.E. 2d 417 (Mass. 1977). This standard permits the interjection of the patient's "best interest"
when there is no way to realistically access what the patient would have wanted. See Right To
Refuse, supra note 47, at 1669.
125. In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). However, the
court was quick to add that judicial intervention must always be available if necessary. Id.
126. Id. Despite the clear direction from the Second District Court of Appeal in Barry, the
refusal of Tampa General Hospital (located in the same judicial district) to withdraw life support
from a terminally ill child led to the introduction of bills during the 1988 and 1989 legislative
session. See Fla. HB 626 (1988) & Fla. HB 609 (1988), and Fla. HB 302 (1989) & Fla. SB 502
(1989). After a grossly handicapped daughter was born two months prematurely to Barbara and
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After evaluating the approach of both the Fourth and Second Dis-
trict Courts, the Florida Supreme Court partially reversed Bludworth,
holding that a court proceeding was cumbersome and unnecessary.'
The court agreed that there was no difference between the privacy
right of a competent and an incompetent terminally ill patient to di-
rect the discontinuance of extraordinary artificial support systems.t '
The court then focused on the means by which the incompetent's right
may be exercised: "The question is who will exercise this right and
what parameters will limit them in the exercise of this right."'' 29 Re-
viewing the approaches in In re Quinlan,130 In re Colyer,'3, and In re
Guardianship of Barry,31 the court held "that the right of a patient,
who is in an irreversibly comatose and essentially vegetative state, to
refuse extraordinary life-sustaining measures, may be exercised either
by his or her close family members or by a guardian of the person of
the patient appointed by the court."'' The court required, however,
Alan Muller, everyone agreed that the child was terminally ill and that life support should be
discontinued. However, because of liability fears of the hospital, the 19-year-old parents were
forced to borrow money to hire a lawyer to obtain a court order to disconnect the respirator.
After personally viewing the child, the judge granted the parents' request. Tampa General pre-
sented the parents with a medical bill for more than $1 million. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health
Care, Subcomm. on Health Practices, tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 19, 1988) (discussion
of HB 626) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.); Fla. H.R.
Comm. on Health Care, tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 26, 1988) (discussion of HB 626)
(available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
The bills sought to permit a parent or guardian of a terminally ill child to execute a declaration
on the minor's behalf which directed that life-prolonging procedures could be withheld or with-
drawn if two physicians certified that the child was terminally ill. This was felt to be necessary
because chapter 765 applied only to a decision not to administer life support to adults. All four
bills were unsuccessful, though Committee Substitute for House Bill 626 made it as far as the
floor of the House where it was defeated 61-50. FLA. H.R. Joug. 722 (Reg. Sess. 1988).
127. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984). For a
critical review of the court's decision see Berry, supra note 41.
128. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d at 923.
129. Id. at 924-25.
130. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). The Quinlan court generally rejected the requirement of
court approval and held that the decision to discontinue life support was to be made by the
family in consultation with the attending physician and a hospital ethics committee. See supra
notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
131. 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983). In Colyer the patient was incompetent following massive
brain damage and was being kept alive by life-support systems. The court held that the decision
to withdraw life-sustaining procedures was controlled by the patient-doctor-family relationship.
However, the court found that a guardian must be appointed to exercise the incompetent's right
to refuse such treatment. Id. at 746.
132. 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). The Barry court held that the parents of a young
child could make the decision not to continue life support if their decision was supported by
competent medical advice, Id. at 372. However, judicial resort should always be available. See
supra note 125 and accompanying text.
133. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984).
The court made clear that there was no necessity to appoint a guardian if family was available.
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that before a close family member or guardian exercised the patient's
right, three physicians must certify that there was no reasonable pros-
pect of the patient's regaining competency and that the patient's life
was being artificially sustained. 3 4 Borrowing from Barry, the Florida
Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of "substituted judgment" and
held that "close family members or legal guardians [may] substitute
their judgment for what they believe the terminally ill incompetent
persons, if competent, would have done under these circum-
stances.""' The court stated that a "living will" would provide per-
suasive evidence of the incompetent's intent and should be given great
weight by the decision maker . 3 6 Finally, as in Barry, the court held
that although judicial approval is not required, judicial review must
be available upon request.'37
After the district court decisions in Bludworth and Barry, but days
before the Florida Supreme Court's reversal in Bludworth, the Florida
Legislature enacted the "Life-Prolonging Procedure Act of Flor-
ida."' 3 8 Introduced in the House'3 by Representatives Byron
Combee' 0° and Beverly Burnsed,' 41 the Act was modeled after Virgi-
nia's 1983 Natural Death Act. 142 Although the Act contained many
134.
[Tihe primary treating physician must certify that the patient is in a permanent vegeta-
tive state and that there is no reasonable prospect that the patient will regain cognitive
brain function and that his existence is being sustained only through the use of ex-
traordinary life-sustaining measures. This certification should be concurred in by at
least two other physicians with specialties relevant to the patient's condition.
Id.
Note that the court does not require that the patient's death be imminent, holding instead that
all that was required was that the patient be in a persistent vegetative state and have no reasona-
ble prospect of regaining mental competency.
The three-physician requirement has been systematically ignored by the Florida Legislature.
See infra notes 145, 393-95, 449-50, and accompanying text.
135. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d at 926. This represents the Florida Supreme Court's adoption of
the "substituted judgment" standard. This is a relatively pure and simple expression of the stan-
dard.
136. Id. While this may seem to undermine the enforcement authority of a living will, it
actually provides greater flexibility because it implies that there are other forms of expressed
patient intent (such as oral statements) which will also be given weight. It also avoids the impli-
cation that the absence of a living will means that the patient wants life-prolonging procedures to
be administered. What is therefore legally enforceable is the person's wishes with regard to the
administration of life support as evidenced by the living will, not the living will itself.
137. Id. at 926-27. The court also held that participating medical personnel or family mem-
bers need only act in good faith. To be liable, the burden will be upon the challenger. Id. at 926.
138. Ch. 84-58, 1984 Fla. Laws 136 (codified at FLA. STAT. ch. 765 (Supp. 1984)). The origi-
nal bill, House Bill 127 (1984), still retained the title "Natural Death Act of Florida."
139. Fla. HB 127 (1984).
140. Repub., Clearwater, 1982-1986.
141. Dem., Lakeland, 1976-1988.
142. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-325.8:1-.8:13 (Michie 1983).
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provisions found in earlier bills, 43 it differed in several significant
ways. An intent section was included that recognized a person's fun-
damental right to control decisions relating to medical care.'" It was
clear that life-prolonging procedures could be withdrawn without ju-
dicial involvement provided that the patient "qualified." 141 While the
Act no longer contained the condition that a person must be expected
to die regardless of the application of life-prolonging procedures be-
fore life-sustaining procedures could be withdrawn, the Act still re-
quired that death be "imminent.' 1  A "declaration"' ' 47 directing that
life-prolonging procedures not be administered could be either written
or oral. 14 The statutory declaration form was no longer "required"
143. Provisions from previous bills included revocation of a declaration, physician immunity
from liability for withdrawing or withholding life-prolonging procedures in accordance with a
patient's declaration, criminal penalties for concealing or falsifying another's declaration, pro-
hibiting mercy killing, excepting suicide from the act, providing that this act shall not affect sale
or impairment of life insurance contracts, providing that nothing in the act shall impair existing
rights or responsibilities, declaring that the failure to make a declaration shall not give rise to a
presumption of the declarant's intent one way or another, and providing that a declaration shall
have no effect during the course of pregnancy. Ch. 84-58, 1984 Fla. Laws 136.
144. Id. § 2 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 765.02 (Supp. 1984)).
145. '"Qualified patient' means a patient who has made a declaration in accordance with
this act and been diagnosed and certified in writing by the attending physician, and by one other
physician who has examined the patient, to be afflicted with a terminal condition." Id. § 3(5)
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 765.03(5) (Supp. 1984)).
This conflicted with the three-physician requirement contained in John F. Kennedy Memorial
Hospital, Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984).
146. The statute defined "terminal condition" as "a condition caused by injury, disease, or
illness from which, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, there can be no recovery and
which makes death imminent." FLA. STAT. § 765.03(6) (Supp. 1984).
This definition would not allow for the supreme court's holding in Bludworth that permitted
life-prolonging procedures to be withdrawn from comatose patients in essentially vegetative
states where death was not necessarily imminent. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d at 926. Nor does it
avoid the problem of determining how long is "imminent." See Berry, supra note 41, at 632. See
also In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990) (discussion of term "imminent").
147. The word "declaration" was substituted for "directive," and "life-prolonging" for
"life-sustaining." Compare FLA. STAT. § 765.03 (2)-(3) (Supp. 1984) with Fla. HB 740 § 2(2)-(3)
(1979).
148. However, the witnessed oral statement had to have been "made by the declarant subse-
quent to the time he is diagnosed as suffering from a terminal condition and in accordance with
the provisions of section 4." Ch. 84-58, § 3(2)(a), 1984 Fla. Laws 136, 137 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 765.03(2)(b) (Supp. 1984)).
The nature of an oral declaration has been subject to much confusion. The original bill stated
that: "An oral declaration may be made by a competent adult in the presence of a physician and
two witnesses by any nonwritten means of communication at any time subsequent to the diagno-
sis of a terminal condition." Fla. HB 127 § 4 (1984). However, the Committee Substitute for
House Bill 127 struck that sentence and inserted: "If the declarant is physically unable to sign
the written declaration, his declaration may be given orally, in which event one of the witnesses
shall subscribe the declarant's signature in the declarant's presence and by his direction."
The original version described a proper procedure for an oral declaration. However, as
amended, it no longer made sense. Instead, it required a written declaration, orally agreed to by
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but "suggested," thus allowing for other earlier or alternative forms
of living wills, as well as living wills containing additional instruc-
tions. 149
Most importantly, the Act allowed the guardian or family of an in-
competent, terminally ill adult patient who had not executed a decla-
ration, in consultation and written agreement with the attending
physician, to decide to withhold or withdraw life-prolonging proce-
dures.5 0 Both the consultation and treatment decision had to be wit-
nessed by two persons, and the order of priority for the selection of a
family member was provided."' This provision and the provision that
the execution of a living will is presumed to be voluntary'12 avoided
the judicial review imposed by the lower court in Bludworth, and an-
ticipated the Florida Supreme Court's holding. A "pregnancy" excep-
tion also was included such that any decision to refuse life support
would be suspended if the patient was found to be pregnant."'
A "transfer clause" was provided that placed an obligation on an
attending physician to transfer the patient to another physician if the
attending physician could not comply with the decision to refuse life
the declarant and signed §y another. The amendment essentially nullified any provision for oral
declarations.
It also made confusing the provision in section 4(2) which stated:
An attending physician who is so notified shall promptly make the declaration or a
copy of the declaration, if written, a part of the declarant's medical records. If the
declaration is oral, the physician shall likewise promptly make the fact of such decla-
ration a part of the patient's medical record.
Ch. 84-58, § 4(2), 1984 Fla. Laws 136-37. This last sentence was meaningless because the oral
declaration was really a written declaration.
This result has ramifications for the holding in In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4
(Fla. 1990), which acknowledges oral declarations, and the 1992 revision of chapter 765.
149. FLA. STAT. § 765.05 (Supp. 1984).
150. Id. § 765.07. This only applies to adults. Thus the parents in Barry would not have been
permitted under this statute to withdraw life-prolonging procedures if it were not for the "cumu-
lative" provision. See id. § 765.15; see also Stratos, supra note 106, at 175-76.
151. FLA. STAT. § 765.07 (Supp. 1984).
152. Id. § 765.10.
153. Id. § 765.08. The original bill, Florida House Bill 127 (1984), did not contain a preg-
nancy provision. However, Committee Substitute for House Bill 127, § 12(2) said that the act
"shall not apply to any pregnant women when, in the opinion of her physician, the fetus is
viable." This was changed in the second Committee Substitute for House Bill 127, § 12(2), which
is the version that became law. The revision said, "The declaration of a qualified patient, or the
written agreement for a patient qualified under section 7, diagnosed as pregnant by the attending
physician shall have no effect during the course of the pregnancy." Ch. 84-58, § 12(2), 1984 Fla.
Laws 136, 140 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 765.08 (Supp. 1984)).
This provision, as passed, is subject to constitutional challenge because it nullifies the choice
to terminate life-prolonging procedures even when the fetus is not viable, and would appear to
create a different standard for competent and incompetent pregnant patients. See Berry, supra
note 41, at 633-34; Stratos, supra note 106, at 175.
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support. 5 4 Although the Act implies that an individual's written direc-
tive would be followed if it meets statutory guidelines, and that any
facility or physician complying with a living will in good faith is im-
mune from liability,'55 there was no provision requiring that a per-
son's desires, as expressed in a properly executed living will, be
honored. 156
The insertion of the word "sustenance" into the definition of "life-
prolonging procedures" was of considerable importance. 5 7 Added in
committee, "life-prolonging procedure" was defined to exclude "the
provision of sustenance or the administration of medication or per-
formance of any medical procedure deemed necessary to provide com-
fort care or to alleviate pain."'5 8 This single phrase was the cause of
extensive legislative debate for the next six years."19
154. FLA. STAT. § 765.09 (Supp. 1984) ("An attending physician who refuses to comply with
the declaration of a qualified patient or the treatment decision of a person designated to make
the decision by the declarant in his declaration or pursuant to section 7 shall make a reasonable
effort to transfer the patient to another physician."). It is unclear what is meant by "reasonable
effort."
155. Id. § 765.10.
156. Without an enforcement mechanism "[tjhe statute is primarily a policy statement that
recognizes an adult's right to control his medical care, subject to cqtain interest of society."
Rebecca Morgan, Florida Law and Feeding Tubes-The Right of Removal, 17 STETSON L. REv.
109, 113 (1987).
157. FLA. STAT. § 765.03 (Supp. 1984). The statute says:
"Life-prolonging procedure" means any medical procedure, treatment or intervention
which:
(a) Utilizes mechanical or other artificial means to sustain, restore, or supplant a
spontaneous vital function; and
(b) When applied to a patient in a terminal condition, would serve only to prolong
the dying process.
"Life-prolonging procedure" shall not include the provision of sustenance or the
administration of medication or performance of any medical procedure deemed neces-
sary to provide comfort care or to alleviate pain.
158. Compare HB 127 with CS for HB 127 (1984). This provision was added at the request
of the Florida Catholic Conference which was concerned, among other things, about the Cali-
fornia case of Elizabeth Bouvia. See Letter from Thomas A. Horkan, Jr., Florida Catholic Con-
ference, to Fla. H.R. Comm. on HRS (Apr. 25, 1984) (reviewing CS for CS for HB 127 and SB
343 (1984)) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.). See also dis-
cussion in Berry, supra note 41, at 632-33; Sidney M. Goetz, My View-Lobbyists Prolong 'Liv-
ing Will' Battles, ST. PETERSaURO TIMEs, July 27, 1988, at 2; Senate Passes Bills on 'Living
Wills, 'Fingerprinting, PALM BEACH POST, May 18, 1984, at A16.
Elizabeth Bouvia was a severely handicapped, but mentally competent, quadriplegic who suf-
fered from cerebral palsy and arthritis. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986). Unable even to feed herself and in constant pain, Ms. Bouvia stopped eating, hop-
ing to starve to death. The hospital inserted an nasogastric tube over her objections for the
purpose of keeping her alive through involuntary forced feeding. Ultimately, the California
Court of Appeal, Second District, found for Ms. Bouvia, holding that she had the right to refuse
any medical treatment, including artificial nourishment or hydration. Id. at 306.
159. See infra notes 170-80 and accompanying text.
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D. Artificial Nutrition and Hydration
The question of the administration of artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion has always been more of a legislative than a judicial issue. This
would be expected because legislatures are by their very nature more
responsive to emotional issues, and the withdrawal of "food and wa-
ter" carries connotations not shared by the removal of sophisticated
medical procedures and treatments (respirators, cardiopulmonary re-
suscitation, kidney dialysis, chemotherapy, ventilators, etc.). As a
consequence, certain jurisdictions' 6° have statutorily made sustenance
an exception from medical procedures that can be withdrawn from
terminally ill patients. Courts, on the other hand, have by and large
refused to classify artificial sustenance differently from any other
form of medical procedure being administered to a patient who is ter-
minally ill or in a persistent vegetative state. 61 Florida was no excep-
tion. When Florida finally passed its Life-Prolonging Procedure Act,
artificial sustenance was distinguished from other permissibly with-
held life-prolonging procedures. 16 2
Despite the statutory prohibition in chapter 765 against the removal
of sustenance, in 1986 the Second District Court of Appeal held in
Corbett v. D'Alessandro that the express right of privacy specifically
articulated in article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution permit-
ted the withdrawal of sustenance from a patient with no reasonable
prospect of regaining cognitive brain function.' 3 Following a massive
brain hemorrhage, Helen Corbett had been left in a persistent vegeta-
tive state, maintained solely by an artificial feeding tube that kept her
physically alive for over three years'" Mrs. Corbett had not left a
living will.
Drawing on its prior holding in Barry, the Second District Court
held that the right of privacy extended to incompetents even if they
are unable to exercise the right themselves and had not previously
stated their wishes.161 Consequently, terminally ill incompetents whose
lives are sustained through the use of extraordinary artificial means
160. Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Mar-
yland, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Caro-
lina, Tennessee, Wisconsin. See Kathleen M. Anderson, Comment, A Medical-Legal Dilemma:
When Can "Inappropriate" Nutrition and Hydration Be Removed in Indiana?, 67 IND. L.J.
479, 481 n.12 (1992).
161. See ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT To DiE §§ 5.1, 5.10 (1989 and Supp. 1990).
162. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
163. 487 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla, 1986).
164. Id. at 370; see also Theresa Defino, State Asks Court To Review Ruling on Feeding
Tubes, S. FLA. MED. REV., Jul. 15, 1986, at 14.
165. Corbett, 487 So. 2d at 370.
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have the same right to refuse life-prolonging procedures as terminally
ill competent persons. The court saw no reason to differentiate be-
tween categories of extraordinary procedures.'6 In order to avoid
both the "sustenance" prohibition in chapter 765 and having to hold
the statute unconstitutional, the court relied upon section 765.15,
Florida Statutes. This section provided that chapter 765 is "cumula-
tive to the existing law," and does not impair any existing rights a
patient may have under the common law or statutes of the state. 67
The court construed this section to incorporate any constitutional
rights assigned to the patient. 6 The Florida Supreme Court denied
review, allowing the district court's opinion to stand. 6 9
From 1985 until 1990, bills were continuously offered to amend
chapter 765 to permit artificial sustenance to be withdrawn as a life-
prolonging procedure in hopeless cases. 70 Proponents of the existing
statute maintained that artificial nutrition was correctly categorized as
providing comfort care and was therefore not a permissibly withheld
life-prolonging procedure. 171 Opponents argued that the administra-
tion of artificial nutrition was invasive, frequently uncomfortable,
even painful, and should not be distinguished from other forms of
life-prolonging procedures which serve only to prolong the process of
dying.' 72 The latter position was supported by the American Medical
Association's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs. 173 Because of
the way the word "sustenance" had been placed in the statute, there
was a question about whether all sustenance was exempt or only suste-
nance that provided comfort care or alleviated pain.Y'4 As a result, the
main thrust of the proposed bills between 1985 and 1988 focused on
166. Id. at 371.
167. FLA. STAT. § 765.15 (Supp. 1984).
168. Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 367, 371 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 492 So. 2d
1331 (Fla. 1986).
169. Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1986).
170. Fla. HB 357 & SB 1060 (1985); HB 670 & SB 1248 (1986); HB 1387 & SB 898 (1987);
HB 406 & SB 501 (1988); HB 494, HB 1084, SB 393 & SB 669 (1989); HB 513 & SB 1264 (1990).
171. See, e.g., Issue Report #34, Report Form for Issues, State Goals & Agenda. Speaker's
Advisory Committee on the Future (Fla. H.R. Comm. on HRS), June 17, 1987 [hereinafter Issue
Report #341; MELsa, supra note 161, § 5.10; Ray Moseley & James A. Jernigan, Withdrawing
Medical Treatments: The D(fficult Case of Withdrawing Nutrition, 74 FLA. M.A. 607 (Aug.
1987).
172. See Issue Report #34, supra note 171.
173. See Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368, 371 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 492
So.2d 1331 (1986) (quoting Mar. 15, 1986, statement of American Med. Ass'n Counsel on Ethi-
cal and Judicial Affairs).
174. See In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 264 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (rejecting
this argument); Morgan, supra note 156, at 131. See also Staff Analyses for PCB 87-01 (precur-
sor to Fla. HB 1387 (1987), Fla. H.R. Comm. on Heath Care); Fla. HB 406 (1988), Fla. H.R.
Comm. on Heath Care; CS for SB 898 (1987). Fla. S. Comm. on HRS.
19921 ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
distinguishing between sustenance as comfort care and sustenance as a
life-prolonging procedure in order to permit sustenance that was not
comfort care to be withdrawn. 17
The implementation of a policy in 1986 by the Florida Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Services that required the administration
of artificial sustenance to all nursing home patients who were unable
to take nutrition orally added to the pressure for reform. Because the
department regulated nursing homes under chapter 400, Florida Sta-
tutes, it interpreted the definition of life-prolonging procedures found
in chapter 765 to require nursing homes to administer nutrition and
175. In 1985, Florida House Bill 357 (by Representatives Elizabeth Metcalf, Democrat, Coral
Gables, 1982-1988; Irma Rochlin, Democrat, Hallandale, 1984-88; and others) and its identical
companion, Senate Bill 1060 (by Senator Bob Johnson, Republican, Sarasota, House 1970-1976,
1982-1984, Senate, 1984-1992) were introduced. The bills distinguished between artificial feed-
ing, which would be considered a life-prolonging procedure which could be withdrawn, and oral
feeding, which was not a life-prolonging procedure and therefore could not be withheld. Neither
made it out of committee. FLA. H.R. JoUR. 245 (Reg. Sess. 1985); FA. S. JoUR. 213 (Reg. Sess.
1985). The Committee Substitute for House Bill 357 required the agreement of three physicians
before the artificial nutrition could be withdrawn or withheld.
In 1986, the same bill was introduced as House Bill 670 (by Representatives Combee; Arthur
Grindle, Republican, Altamonte Springs, 1982-1992; Metcalf; Alzo Reddick, Democrat, Or-
lando; and Rochlin) and its identical companion, Senate Bill 1248 (by Senator Johnson). While
the House bill was reported favorably with amendments, the Senate bill died in committee. FLA.
LEIS., HISTORY OF LEGISL.ATION, 1986 REOULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 293, HB
670; Id., HISTORY OF SENATE Bn.LS at 187, SB 1248. The amendment to the House bill required
the agreement of two physicians that the administration of artificial nutrition met the definition
of life-prolonging procedure before sustenance could be withdrawn, and that the patient specify
in a separate statement in the living will the desire to have sustenance withdrawn. Fla. HB 1270
(1986).
In 1987 the Florida House Committee on Health Care sponsored Florida House Bill 1387,
which was introduced in the Senate as Senate Bill 898 (by Senator Jack Gordon, Democrat,
Miami Beach, 1972-1992). Though recast, the bill still focused on the distinction between suste-
nance as a life-prolonging procedure, and sustenance as a form of comfort care. The House bill
carried the caveat that written directives executed before October 1, 1987, shall not be presumed
to authorize the withholding of sustenance unless expressly stated. (House Bill 1387 was read a
second time, but failed to reach a third reading. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1987
REoULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE Bias at 388, HB 1387. Senate Bill 898 died in committee.
Id., HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 150, SB 898.)
In 1988 the Florida House Committee on Health Care sponsored the same bill as House Bill
406. The Committee Substitute for House Bill 406 amended the definition for "life-prolonging
procedures" to remove any reference to "sustenance" and removed the requirement that the
withdrawal of sustenance be expressly requested in the declaration. The Senate bill, Senate Bill
501 (by Senator Pat Frank, Democrat, Tampa, 1978-1988), which mirrored the Committee Sub-
stitute for House Bill 406, was voted out of committee with amendments. The first Senate
amendment removed the requirement that the patient have a declaration before sustenance could
be removed. The other amendment required each physician to provide a statement that the pro-
vision of sustenance was not necessary to provide comfort care or alleviate pain. Both bills died
on Calendar. FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1988 REOULAR SESSION, HIS-
TORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 278, HB 406; Id., HISTORY OF SENATE BIuLS at 103, SB 501.
316 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:291
hydration regardless of physician or family desires.7 6 Refusal to allow
the nursing home to provide sustenance to a resident would result in
the resident being discharged from the facility.'1 This harsh policy
was softened in 1988 when Rule 1OD-29. 110, Florida Administrative
Code, which regulated the dietary procedures of nursing homes, was
amended to permit a nursing home facility to forego the administra-
tion of artificial nutrition and hydration under certain very narrow
circumstances. 78
In 1989, partly as a result of the impending Florida court review of
In re Guardianship of Browning,' the Legislature passed a bill per-
mitting the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration under cer-
tain carefully defined circumstances. s0 In 1986 Estelle Browning
suffered a massive stroke at age eighty-six, and sustained brain dam-
age that was major, permanent, and irreversible.' Unable to swal-
low, a gastric tube was inserted.8 2 In 1988, nearly two years after her
stroke, Mrs. Browning's guardian, Doris Herbert, petitioned to termi-
nate all artificial life support, including artificial sustenance, on the
basis of a living will that Mrs. Browning had executed in 1985,18 which
requested that all life-prolonging procedures be withheld or with-
drawn if her condition was diagnosed as terminal and incurable, and
176. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., OPLC Policy Letter #5-86 (Apr. 2,
1986).
177. Id.
178. FLA. ADmN. CODE ANN. r. IOD-29.110(5)-(6) (1988). If the patient was incompetent,
artificial sustenance could be avoided if the resident was an adult with a terminal condition as
certified by two physicians and it could be shown that artificially administered nutrition or hy-
dration would cause harm or pain, and the family concurred. The rule required that hydration or
nutrition be provided if two physicians determined that death would result from dehydration or
starvation rather than from the underlying terminal illness or injury. Id. If the patient were
competent, he or she would be permitted to refuse both oral and artificial sustenance if two
physicians diagnosed his condition as terminal. Id.
Senate Bill 738, introduced in 1988 by Senator Gordon, sought to do by statute what HRS did
by rule in 1988. The bill was an amendment to § 765.03, Florida Statutes, removing the words
"sustenance" and "imminent" from the definition of terminal condition. Fla. SB 738 (1988)
(proposed amendment to FLA. STAT § 765.03). The bill died in committee. FLA. LEGis., FINAL
LEGISLATIVE BiLL INFORMATION, 1988 REouLAR SEssioN, HIsToRY OF SENATE BILLs at 134, SB
738.
The pertinent sections of the administrative rule were repealed in 1991 as the result of In re
Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990), which made no distinction between suste-
nance and other permissibly withdrawn forms of medical treatment. 17 Fla. Admin. Weekly
1957 (May 3, 1991).
179. 543 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), aff'd, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
180. The 1989 bills, Florida House Bills 494 & 1084, were approved by the Legislature but
vetoed by Governor Martinez.
181. Browning, 543 So. 2d at 261.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 262.
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if death was imminent.'1 In addition, Mrs. Browning's will specifi-
cally indicated her desire that nutrition and hydration not be pro-
vided."8 5 Relying upon chapter 765, the Life-Prolonging Procedure
Act,8 6 the trial court denied the petition to terminate life-prolonging
procedures, ruling that death was not "imminent" as long as Mrs.
Browning continued to receive food and hydration. The trial court
was not asked to and did not consider constitutional remedies. 187
The Second District Court had already addressed the issue of with-
drawing artificial sustenance in Corbett v. D'Alessandro and con-
cluded that artificially administered sustenance was indistinguishable
from other life-prolonging procedures.' But Browning presented two
additional issues'8 9 that the Second District Court had not had to con-
front in Corbett and that had not been addressed by the Florida Su-
preme Court in Bludworth. 9° First, although Mrs. Browning was
incompetent, she showed indications of cognition and was therefore
not in a persistent vegetative state.191 The Bludworth court had specifi-
cally held that a guardian or family member could act on the patient's
behalf only when the patient had been certified by a doctor to be in a
permanent vegetative state. 92 Second, Mrs. Browning's condition was
not necessarily "terminal" because her life could theoretically be pro-
longed indefinitely as long as artificial nutrition was provided. '91
Like the trial court, the Second District Court also looked at the
statutory scheme provided by chapter 765 and concluded that no stat-
utory remedy was available.' 94 The court based this conclusion on the
statutory exclusion of sustenance from the category of life-prolonging
procedures that could be withdrawn, as well as the statutory definition
of terminal condition which was defined to mean that death was im-
minent.191
184. Id. at 275.
185. Id. at 262, 275.
186. FLA. STAT. ch. 765 (Supp. 1984).
187. In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 261, 278 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), aff'd,
568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
188. 487 So. 2d 368, 371 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).
189. Browning, 543 So. 2d at 261.
190. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984).
191. Browning, 543 So. 2d at 261.
192. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d at 926 ("However, before either a close family member or legal
guardian may exercise the patient's right, the primary treating physician must certify that the
patient is in a permanent vegetative state and that there is no reasonable prospect that the patient
will regain cognitive brain function.").
193. In Bludworth, Mr. Landy's death was being prolonged rather than postponed by the
administration of extraordinary medical procedures. Id. at 922-23.
194. In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 265 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), aff'd, 568
So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
195. Id. The court considered three possible constructions of the word "imminent." Was the
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As in Corbett, the court found recourse in section 765.15, Florida
Statutes, which provided that the provisions of the chapter 765 were
cumulative and thus could accommodate any additional rights that
Mrs. Browning enjoyed under the statute, common law, or constitu-
tion.'9 The court held therefore that a remedy must be available be-
cause under article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution, Florida
constitutionally recognizes a right of self-determination that extends
to the medical decisions of incompetent as well as competent pa-
tients. 197 When the person is incompetent the decision must be dele-
gated to a surrogate decision maker. 19 The court then spent the major
part of its opinion discussing the factors the surrogate should consider
and how the surrogate should carry out this responsibility to avoid
judicial intervention.199 These factors include the severity of the medi-
cal condition; the competency of the patient; the decision that the pa-
tient, if competent, would make; and the state's interests."
In looking at the first factor, the court recognized that the surrogate
must depend on available medical evidence and certificates from the
patient's treating physicians as to the patient's medical condition.
11
As to the second factor, the court refused to require that the patient
be in a permanent vegetative state before a surrogate can make a deci-
sion on the patient's behalf.2 2 It was sufficient that the patient was no
longer sufficiently competent to exercise her right of self-determina-
tion and was not expected to regain competency. Third, as in Barry,
the court held that the surrogate is obligated to make the decision that
the patient would have made under the doctrine of "substituted judg-
ment. ' 203 Finally, the court acknowledged the state's interest by re-
quiring the surrogate to support his or her decision with clear and
evaluation of the "imminence" of death to be made (1) with the continuation of all medical
treatment, (2) without the administration of life-prolonging procedures, or (3) without any medi-
cal treatment except comfort care? Id. at 265. The court rejected the first, concluding that there
would be no need to create a procedure since death would almost inevitably occur before the
withdrawal of life-support took place. Id. The third was equally unacceptable because the with-
drawal of certain procedures, such as food and water, would result in death even though the
patient's condition was not necessarily fatal. Id. The court thus settled on the second interpreta-
tion as the only reasonable interpretation. Id.
This construction of the word "imminent" is significant because it can accommodate the
withdrawal of treatment from patients whose conditions are irreversible yet whose biological life
can be sustained indefinitely (e.g., Karen Quinlan, Nancy Cruzan, and Estelle Browning).
196. Id. at 265.
197. Id. at 266-67.
198. id. at 267.
199. Id. at 267-73.
200. Id. at 271-73.
201. Id. at 271.
202. Id. at 272.
203. Id.
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convincing evidence.?04 Having established a procedure for a surrogate
to exercise an incompetent patient's constitutional right of self-deter-
mination, the court affirmed the trial court's holding without preju-
dice to the guardian to file a renewed petition in light of the court's
scheme. 201 It also made a plea that the Legislature give serious consid-
eration to the issues raised by the opinion and certified to the Florida
Supreme Court the question of whether an incompetent patient who is
not suffering from a terminal condition may exercise his or her right
of self-determination and forego sustenance.Z0
As the result of the district court opinion in Browning, the 1989 bill
passed by the Legislature that permitted the withholding or with-
drawal of artificial sustenance had a different emphasis than earlier
bills. The earlier bills had primarily sought to distinguish sustenance
as comfort care from sustenance as a life-prolonging procedure.2w
204. Id. at 273.
205. Id. at 274.
206. Id.
207. Fla. CS for HB 494 & HB 1084 (1989).
Florida House Bill 494 (1989) (by Representatives Jack Tobin, Democrat, Margate) and Senate
Bill 392 (1989) (by Senator Gordon), were similar versions of Senate Bill 501 (1988) with the
addition of the amendment removing the requirement that the patient have executed a declara-
tion. Florida House Bill 1084 (1989) (by Representative Peter Wallace, Democrat, St. Peters-
burg) and Florida Senate Bill 669 (1989) (by Senator Jeanne Malchon, Democrat, St. Petersburg,
1982-1992), however, had some new provisions.
The definition of "terminal condition" was altered to mean "an incurable or irreversible con-
dition that, without the administration of life-sustaining treatment, will, in the opinion of the
attending physician, result in death within a relatively short time." Fla. HB 1084 & Fla. SB 669
(1989). As pointed out by the district court in Browning, this definition removes ambiguity and
hinges the meaning of "terminal" on the administration of life-prolonging procedures and
would permit the withdrawal of sustenance from a person like Estelle Browning who was not in
a persistent vegetative state, or like Helen Corbett who was in a persistent vegetative state but
who could live indefinitely with the administration of sustenance. In re Guardianship of Brown-
ing, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
Florida House Bill 1084 (1989) and Florida Senate Bill 669 (1989) also amended the declara-
tion form to permit a patient to opt for or against the administration of sustenance. Section
765.05, Florida Statutes, was further amended to make clear that before sustenance could be
withheld a patient must expressly request in their declaration that sustenance not be adminis-
tered. If the patient had not executed a declaration then sustenance could be withheld only if two
physicians affirmed in writing that the patient is terminal, and that the procedure for administer-
ing sustenance would be invasive, painful, and medically ineffective. The bills also added a new
provision permitting the recognition of living wills executed in other states.
Combining the House and Senate bills, Committee Substitute for House Bills 494 & 1084
(1989) and Committee Substitute for Senate Bills 392 & 669 (1989) dropped the redefinition of
"terminal condition," but kept the addition to the declaration form, the conditions that must be
met before life support could be withdrawn if the patient had not executed a declaration, and the
provision permitting declarations from other jurisdictions to be recognized in Florida. Commit-
tee Substitutes for House Bills 494 & 1084 were passed by the House, substituted for Committee
Substitutes for Senate Bills 392 & 669, and were passed by the Senate, but vetoed by the Gover-
nor. FLA. H.R. JouR. 416 (Reg. Sess. 1989).
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First, the 1989 bill amended the definition of "life-prolonging proce-
dure" to permit sustenance to be included as a life-prolonging proce-
dure.20 8 Second, it amended the declaration form to permit a person to
opt not to have artificial nutrition and hydration administered. 2°9
Third, the bill created a new section that provided the circumstances
under which sustenance may be withheld or withdrawn as a life pro-
longing procedure. 21 0 Under the new section, sustenance could be
withheld or withdrawn if two physicians documented that it qualified
as a life-prolonging procedure (versus comfort care), a guardian or
relatives provide consent, and the patient had executed a declaration
authorizing such a decision.2 1' Moreover, if the patient had not exe-
cuted a declaration, sustenance could still be refused if it could be
shown that artificially administered nutrition and hydration would
cause harm or be medically ineffective.2 1 2 Finally, a provision allowing
the recognition of declarations executed in other jurisdictions was also
included. 213
Under pressure from the Florida Catholic Conference and Florida
Right to Life, which both argued that the bill represented an inevita-
ble step toward euthanasia, and following his own personal convic-
tion, Governor Bob Martinez vetoed the bill.2 1 4 Reportedly, no other
legislative issue in the 1989 session drew as many letters to the Gover-
nor.2" ' Martinez explained in his veto message that the bill was prema-
ture because the Browning decision was then before the Florida
Supreme Court. 216
The Legislature tried again in 1990, and House Bill 513, as
amended,21 7 became law without the Governor's signature on June 30,
208. Fla. CS for HB 494 & HB 1084, § 1 (1989) (First Engrossed).
209. Id. § 2.
210. Id. § 3.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. §4.
214. Paul Anderson, Living Will Provision Vetoed, MiAMI HERALD, July 4, 1989, at 5A; Bill
Halldin, Right-To-Die Bill Gets Veto from Governor, TAMPA TRIB., July 4, 1989, at IB; Mary E.
Klas, Martinez Veto Postpones 'Right-To-Die' Legislation, PALM BEACH POST, July 4, 1989, at
16A.
215. Bill Halldin, Martinez Barraged by Letters, TAMPA TRIB., June 23, 1989, at lB.
216. "1 am concerned that the Legislature has prematurely entered this arena without the
complete constitutional guidance from the State Supreme Court on this most complex issue and
upon the fundamental issue of each individual's constitutional right to privacy as guaranteed by
Florida's Constitution in Article I, Section 23." Veto message from Bob Martinez, Gov., to Jim
Smith, Secretary of State (July 3, 1989) (CS for HB 494 & HB 1084) (available at Fla. Dep't of
State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.). Ironically, Martinez was correct. The Florida Su-
preme Court's decision in Browning made both the 1989 legislation and 1990 Act unconstitu-
tional.
217. Florida House Bill 513 (1990) (by Representative Susan Guber, Democrat, Miami, 1986-
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1990.2s Without doubt, the United States Supreme Court decision in
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,1 9 handed down
on June 25, 1990, was a factor keeping the Governor from vetoing the
bill a second time. The Cruzan court drew no distinction between pro-
viding food and water and other forms of medical treatment. 2 0
While chapter 90-223, Florida Laws, allowed the withdrawal of sus-
tenance, it could only be done under severely restricted circumstances.
First, the Act amended the definition of "life-prolonging procedure"
to permit sustenance to be included as a life-prolonging procedure as
well as a form of comfort care.1z Second, it amended the declaration
form to permit a person to opt to forego nutrition and hydration.2 2 2
Third, a new section was added to chapter 765 to provide both the
circumstances and procedures for permitting sustenance to be with-
1992) and its identical companion, Florida Senate Bill 1264 (1990) (by Senator Gordon),
amended the definition of "life-prolonging procedure" to make clear that only sustenance ad-
ministered for the purpose of providing comfort care or alleviating pain was excluded from the
category of permissibly withdrawn life-prolonging procedures; they also created a new section to
permit sustenance to be withheld if two physicians document that sustenance is not necessary to
provide comfort care and it qualifies as a life-prolonging procedure. The bill included the caveat
that written directives executed before October 1, 1990, could not be presumed to authorize the
withholding of sustenance as a life-prolonging procedure unless expressly stated in the directive.
Senate Bill 1264 died in the Senate Committee on Judiciary-Civil. FLA. LEOis., FINAL LEGISLA-
TIVE BILL INFORMATION, REGULAR SESSION 1990, HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 119, SB 1264.
Florida House Bill 1641 (1990) (by Representative James King, Republican, Jacksonville) and
Senate Bill 2144 (1990) (by Senator Curtis Kiser, Republican, Palm Harbor), as filed, were simi-
lar to Committee Substitute for House Bills 464 & 1084 (1989), that had passed the Legislature
but had been vetoed by the Governor. However, there was no requirement that the patient have
executed a declaration requesting that sustenance not be administered, and there was a provision
permitting the patient's next of kin to negate a decision to forego sustenance as a life prolonging
procedure. The Committee Substitute for House Bill 1641 softened this to permit the family to
negate the decision only "for a reasonable length of time." Both the House and Senate bills were
voted favorably out of committee, and Committee Substitute for House Bill 1641 was taken up
on the House floor. FLA. H.R. JouR. 212 (Reg. Sess. 1990); FLA. S. JouR. 403 (Reg. Sess. 1990).
House Bill 513 (1990), as amended, was really a combination of these two bills with additional
changes. FLA. S. JouR. 659 (Reg. Sess. 1990).
218. Ch. 90-223, 1990 Fla. Laws 1643.
219. llOS. Ct. 2841 (1990).
220. Id. at 2851.
221.
The term "life-prolonging procedure" does not include the provision of sustenance or
the administration of medication or performance of any medical procedure deemed
necessary to provide comfort care or to alleviate pain; provided, however, that suste-
nance can be included as a life-prolonging procedure in accordance with the provisions
of s. 765.075.
Ch. 223, § 1, 1990 Fla. Laws 1643 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 765.03(3) (Supp. 1990)).
222. Id. § 2 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 765.05(t) (Supp. 1990)). It is interesting to ponder the
purpose of the box permitting a declarant to select not to have nutrition and hydration with-
drawn because the new statute required sustenance to be administered unless the declarant had
expressly requested that it not be.
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held or withdrawn. 223 The patient must have expressly authorized the
withholding or withdrawal of nutrition or hydration in a declaration,
and two physicians must document in the patient's record that the
provision of sustenance is a life-prolonging procedure and that death
is imminent.22 4 However, a patient's next of kin retained the right to
suspend the decision to refuse sustenance for a reasonable length of
time. 225 Further, a caveat was added to provide that the ability to sus-
pend the decision was not to be interpreted to permit relatives to grant
approval for withholding or withdrawing sustenance if the patient had
not expressly directed that it be withheld in a living will.22 Finally, the
chapter contained the provision permitting recognition of declarations
executed in another state. 7
Both the United States Supreme Court's June 1990 decision in Cru-
zan and the Florida Supreme Court's September 1990 decision in
Browning made clear that the restrictions placed on a decision to with-
draw sustenance in the new legislation were unconstitutional. Under
Cruzan, a person had a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in re-
fusing medical treatment including artificial sustenance.2 Under arti-
cle I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution, a person had a
fundamental privacy right to refuse all medical treatment.2 29 If suste-
nance was a medical procedure that could be withdrawn-as almost
all the courts including the United States Supreme Court agreed-
close relatives of the patient could not order the administration of ar-
tificial sustenance against the patient's wishes, and it was not neces-
sary for the patient to specifically request that sustenance be withheld
since sustenance was not distinguishable from other medical proce-
dures. In the meantime a new and potentially more effective method
for delegating health care decision making was under way.
II. HEALTH CARE SURROGACY AND THE DuRABLE POWER OF
ATTORNEY
In March 1983, the President's Commission for the Study of Ethi-
cal Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research,
223. Id. § 3 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 765.075 (Supp. 1990)).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. This section was added as a concession in the hopes that Governor Martinez would
not veto the bill again. Phil Willon, House Panel Approves Modified 'Right To Die' Bill for
Terminally Ill, TAMPA TRm., Apr. 6, 1990, at 12B.
227. Ch. 90-223, § 4, 1990 Fla. Laws 1643 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 765.17 (Supp. 1990)).
228. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851 (1990). See infra notes
285-89 and accompanying text.
229. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 11 (Fla. 1990). See infra notes 322-25
and accompanying text.
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published its influential Deciding To Forego Life-Sustaining Treat-
ment: A Report on the Ethical, Medical and Legal Issues in Treatment
Decisions. The comprehensive report included the recommendation
that persons execute "advance directives" designating a surrogate to
make medical treatment decisions in the event of the person's
incapacity. 30 The Commission saw a need for creating a procedure for
substitute decision making that was not only less cumbersome and
costly than legal guardianship, but also had more legal enforceability
than "instructive" directives such as living wills.3'
Noting that forty-two states had enacted "durable power of attor-
ney" statutes, the Commission suggested that these statutes should be
used to provide a legal foundation for advance directives. 2 2 Although
traditionally used in the area of property management, the Commis-
sion members felt that the language of these statutes could accommo-
date control over medical treatment.233 Advance directives appointing
another to make health care decisions have the potential to control a
far broader range of cases with firmer legal effect than declarations or
living wills which are narrowly directed toward requesting that life
support be withheld.
The concept of health care surrogacy also received a boost from
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in her concurring opinion in Cruzan.234
The majority opinion was clear that a state was not obligated to honor
without question a surrogate's exercise of a person's constitutionally
based right to refuse medical treatment.235 However, it did not address
whether a state might be required to defer to the decision of a surro-
gate when a patient had expressed a desire that the decision be made
by that individual. Without elaborating, Justice O'Connor strongly
230. PRESIDENT'S COaM'N, supra note 12, at 136.
231. Id. at 131. The Commission distinguished between "instructive directives" and "proxy
directives." The first specifies the type of care a person wants, while the second specifies a surro-
gate to make decisions if the person is unable to do so. A "living will" is an instructive directive,
while a durable power of attorney is a proxy directive. Id. at 136. Unlike durable powers of
attorney, which have legal and statutory recognition, an instructive directive has an uncertain
legal effect because it is unclear who is to interpret and carry out the instructions and what will
be their accompanying liability. The most effective course seems to be to combine the two by
including special directions in a proxy directive.
232. Id. at 137. A power of attorney is a document executed by a "principal" which confers
upon another, "the attorney-in-fact," the authority to perform certain acts on the principal's
behalf. The power may be limited to only a specific act, or it may confer a general authority to
act on behalf of the principal on all matters. Because the power of attorney becomes inoperative
upon the principal's incapacity, many states have recognized durable powers permitting the at-
torney in fact to continue to act after the principal's incapacity.
233. Id.
234. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2856 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
235. Id. at 2852.
19921
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suggested that a state may be constitutionally obligated to honor the
treatment selections of a surrogate appointed by an individual to
make such decisions on behalf of the incompetent person.236 She noted
that delegating the authority to a family member, by means of a
durable power of attorney, or by designating another to carry out the
intent of a living will, is becoming a common method of planning for
the future and may become a valuable additional safeguard for per-
mitting a patient to direct his medical care.237
In 1990, just before the Cruzan decision, the Legislature enacted
chapter 90-232, Laws of Florida, which permitted the designation of a
health care surrogate with the authority to make health care decisions
upon a patient's incapacity. 28 Because of a desire to avoid the legal
connotation and accompanying belief that one needed to hire a lawyer
to execute a power of attorney, the portion of the Act that created a
procedure for the designation of a health care surrogate made no ref-
erence to the durable power of attorney statute although it was con-
ceptually very similar. A different portion of the Act, however,
amended section 709.08, Florida Statutes, to expressly permit a dura-
ble power to extend to medical care decisions. 239
Unlike that for the Life-Prolonging Procedure Act, the main initia-
tive for chapter 745, which regulates health care surrogacy, came from
the Florida Senate and Senator Jeanne Malchon. At the time the
first "surrogacy" bill was introduced, there was an increasing need on
the part of medical institutions and facilities to find a solution to pro-
viding medical treatment for Florida's growing population of incom-
petent patients with no families, without having to go through the
cumbersome, time-consuming, and expensive process of having a
guardian appointed by a court .2 l In addition, there was also a need to
236. Id. at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
237. Id.; see also In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 15 n. 14 (1990).
238. Ch. 90-232, §§ 11-23, 1990 Fla. Laws 1729 (codified at FLA. SSAT. ch. 745 (Supp.
1990)).
239. Id. § 24 (amending FLA. STAT. § 709.08(1)).
240. The early bills proposing the adoption of a Florida Surrogacy Act were based on drafts
by Dale J. Hyland, a constituent of Senator Malchon who was instrumental in promoting Flori-
da's adoption of a surrogacy act. See Dale J. Hyland, Unpublished Discussion Draft (July 1985)
(available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.). This draft served as a
model for Florida Senate Bill 307 (1987), the first health care surrogacy bill.
241. The following represented possible methods of substitute decision-making:
Chapter 744, Florida Statutes (1987), provided for the court appointment of a guardian of the
person which could include the ability to make all health care decisions.
Section 744.312, Florida Statutes (1987), provided a mechanism for the principal to appoint
another to act as guardian whether related to the person or not. The designation must be wit-
nessed by two persons and signed by the principal. The court, when petitioned, must give weight
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have someone who could apply for public benefits for indigent, in-
competent residents of hospitals and nursing homes.
Health care surrogacy bills were introduced in 1987, 242 1988, 241 and
to this designation.
Section 394.467(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1987), provided for the court appointment of a guard-
ian advocate to consent to mental health treatment (The Baker Act).
Section 393.12, Florida Statutes (1987), provided for the court appointment of a guardian
advocate for a developmentally disabled person.
Chapter 400, part 1, Florida Statutes (1987), allowed the resident of a nursing home or the
resident's guardian to designate a "resident designee" to be the resident's "representative for a
specific, limited purpose."
Section 394.459, Florida Statutes (1987), provided for the appointment of a representative of
the patient "to receive notice of proceedings for and during hospitalizations and to take actions
for and on behalf of the patient." The representative could be a spouse, adult child, parent,
adult next of kin, adult friend, Human Rights Advocacy Committee, or the Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services.
Section 709.08, Florida Statutes (1987), allowed for the appointment of a durable power of
attorney, however, it was limited to close family members, and could be revoked upon an adju-
dication of incompetency. At the time it was unclear whether this section could be used to con-
sent solely to medical treatment.
Section 765.07, Florida Statutes (1987), provided for the recognition of living wills, or the
appointment of a relative or guardian to make the decision to terminate life-prolonging proce-
dures in consultation with the patient's physician, when there was no living will and the patient
was incompetent and terminally ill. Court approval was not required. The Florida Supreme
Court decision in John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 121 (Fla.
1984), also recognized this procedure and extended it to patients in a persistent vegetative state.
Section 768.46, Florida Statutes (1987) (medical consent), permits certain health care practi-
tioners to provide medical treatment without the patient's consent provided that the practitioner
acts within accepted standards of practice, and that a reasonable patient, from the information
provided, would have undergone the procedure had he been advised.
242. Fla. SB 307 (1987) (by Sen. Malchon). Senate Bill 307 was withdrawn and indefinitely
postponed. FLA. S. JotuR. 3461 (Reg. Sess. 1987).
243. Fla. SB 159 (1988) (by Sen. Malchon) & Fla. HB 1158(1988) (by Rep. Metcalf).
The 1987 and 1988 bills were identical. Definitions were provided for the following phrases:
physician, incompetent to consent, express and informed consent, health care surrogate, substi-
tuted judgment, and department (HRS). Fla. SB 307, § 3 (1987); Fla. SB 159, § 3 (1988); & Fla.
HB 1158, § 3 (1988). Two physicians were required to concur in a patient's incompetency before
a "health care surrogate" could assume authority to make treatment decisions during the pa-
tient's incompetency. Fla. SB 307, § 4 (1987); Fla. SB 159, § 4 (1988); & HB 1158, & 4 (1988).
The patient's competency was to be reviewed every 30 days. Fla. SB 307, § 7 (1987); Fla. SB 159,
§ 7 (1988); & Fla. HB 1158, § 7 (1988). The hospital or nursing home was obligated to ascertain
at the time of admission whether a surrogate had been appointed. Where the patient had not
designated a surrogate one could be selected from the patient's family or friends, or from a list
of qualified candidates who had no potential conflict of interest. Fla. SB 307, § 5 (1987); Fla. SB
159, § 5 (1988); & Fla. HB 1158, § 5 (1988). The surrogate was to use the doctrine of "substi-
tuted judgment" when making decisions on behalf of the patient and would have the ability to
consent, in writing, to medical treatment; have access to the patient's medical records; authorize
the release of the records, make application for public benefits; and authorize the transfer and
admission of a patient to a facility. Fla. SB 307, § 6 (1987); Fla. SB 159, § 6 (1988); & Fla. HB
1158, § 6 (1989). Health care providers were required to provide the surrogate with sufficient
information to make an informed treatment choice. Fla. SB 307, § 7 (1987); Fla. SB 159, § 7
(1988); & Fla. HB 1158, § 7 (1988). The surrogate was forbidden from providing consent to
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19892 before the Health Care Surrogacy Act was adopted in 1990.241
Part of the initial resistance to the act was due to the ongoing review
and rewrite of chapter 744, the Guardianship Act.20 It was felt that
abortion, sterilization, electroshock treatment, psychosurgery, experimental treatments, termina-
tion of life-support, and voluntary admission to a psychiatric facility. Fla. SB 307, § 8 (1987);
Fla. SB 159, § 8 (1988); Fla. HB 1158, § 8 (1988).
Both Senate Bill 159 (1988) and House Bill 1158 (1988) died in committee. FLA. LEGIS., FINAL
LEGIsLATivE BILL INFORMATION, REGULAR SESSION 1988, HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 54, SB 159;
Id., HISTORY oF HOUSE BILLS at 383, HB 1158.
244. Fla. SB 900 (1989) (by Sen. Malchon) and Fla. HB 1135 (1989) (by Rep. Gordon).
The 1989 version of the bill was more sophisticated than earlier versions. Definitions were
added for health care, health care decision, and health care provider. CS for SB 900 (1989) & CS
for HB 1135 § 2 (1989). A procedure for the written, witnessed designation of a surrogate was
added. Neither the treating health care provider, an employee or relative, an employee of the
facility or relative of the operator of the facility in which the patient resided, or a guardian of
the property of the person, were permitted to act as the patient's surrogate. CS for SB 900, § 3
(1989) & CS for HB § 3 (1989). A section was added which declared that a patient was presumed
to be competent to make decisions unless shown otherwise. Incapacity was not to be inferred
from hospitalization for mental illness, nor mental retardation. CS for SB 900 § 4 (1989) & CS
for HB § 4 (1989). Instead of a determination of incompetency by two physicians, a committee
consisting of the attending physician, a psychiatrist or psychologist, and a responsible citizen
were to evaluate the patient, and a determination of the patient's condition was to be stated in a
written report placed in the patient's record. CS for SB 900 i.e., § 5 (1989) & CS for HB i.e., § 5
(1989). Unlike earlier bills, the surrogate was to have authority to refuse consent to the adminis-
tration of life-prolonging procedures per chapter 765, unless the patient had authorized another
to make such decisions. In addition, the surrogate was to have authority over later-appointed
guardians in matters concerning health care unless a court removed this power. CS for SB 900
i.e., § 6 (1989) & CS for HB i.e., § 6 (1989). A section was added providing a procedure for the
revocation of the designation of a surrogate. CS for SB 900, § 9 (1989) & CS for HB, § 9 (1989).
All designations of surrogacy were to expire seven years after the date of execution unless the
patient was incompetent. CS for SB 900 i.e., § 10 (1989) & CS for HB i.e., § 10 (1989). A section
was added which prohibited a facility from requiring the designation of a surrogate as a condi-
tion of admission or treatment. CS for SB 900, § 11 (1989) & CS for HB, § 11 (1989). A new
section providing immunity for health care providers and facilities for the treatment decisions of
surrogates was added. CS for SB 900 i.e., § 12 (1989) & CS for HB, § 12 (1989).
Noticeably missing from the committee substitutes to both the Senate and House bills was the
section permitting the designation of a surrogate where none had been appointed by the patient.
A provision forbidding a parent or legal guardian from withholding emergency medical treat-
ment to a minor based on religious beliefs was added to the committee substitutes for House Bill
1135. Fla. CS for HB 1135 § 14 (1989).
Senate Bill 900 was voted favorably by the Senate Committee on Health Care as a committee
substitute, but died in the Senate Committee Judiciary. House Bill 1135 was passed out favora-
bly as a committee substitute by the House Committee on Health Care, but died on the calendar.
FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, REGULAR SESSION 1989, HISTORY OF SENATE
BILS at 156, SB 900; Id., HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLs at 411, HB 1135.
245. Ch. 90-232, 1990 Fla. Laws 1279 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 709.08 (Supp. 1990)).
246. Ch. 89-96, 1989 Fla. Laws 173. The review and subsequent amendment of Florida's
guardianship statutes was the result of an in-depth analysis by the Study Commission on Guardi-
anship Law, created by chapter 88-268, Laws of Florida. The 15-member commission included
Florida Supreme Court Justice Rosemary Barkett, Senators Weinstein and Fred Dudley, Repub-
lican, Cape Coral, and Representatives John Cosgrove, Democrat, Miami, and Ronald Glick-
man, Democrat, Tampa, as well as other members of the academic, judicial, and professional
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the need for health care surrogacy would be met by the revision of
that chapter. 247 Further, there were also serious reservations over the
fact that a health care surrogate, unlike a guardian, would not have to
answer to a higher authority unless challenged.2 However, following
the 1989 rewrite of chapter 744, it was clear that the increasing need
for a more efficient process, permitting another to apply for public
benefits and to make health care decisions for incompetent patients,
still had not been addressed.?49
Sections 11 through 23 of chapter 90-232210 created a procedure that
permitted a competent adult to designate a surrogate to make health
care decisions when he or she became incompetent. The designation
must be in writing, signed and witnessed by two persons.21 The desig-
nation could remain effective for up to seven years (or longer if the
patient remained incapacitated). 252 A health care facility was obligated
to ascertain whether a surrogate had been designated, 253 but could not
require an individual to designate a surrogate as a condition of treat-
ment. 2 4 Certain restrictions were placed on who could act as a surro-
communities. See Report & Recommendations of the Study Commission on Guardianship Law
(Mar. 1, 1989).
247. See Letter from Dale Hyland to Senator Malchon (Jan. 8, 1990) (available at Fla. Dep't
of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.) (disagreeing with Senator Weinstein's belief that
the creation of the an "emergency temporary guardian" under the 1989 revision of chapter 744
would fill the need for the designation of a health care surrogate).
248. See Memorandum from Brent Taylor, Chairman, Disability Law Committee of The
Florida Bar, to Bunny Stanfield, Analyst, Committee on Health Care (Apr. 5, 1989) (available at
Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
249. See Robert C. Waters, Florida Durable Power of Attorney: The Need for Reform, 17
FLA. ST. U. L. R v. 520 (1990). The 1989 guardianship legislation created "emergency tempo-
rary guardianships" and "preneed guardianships." The emergency guardian could represent an
alleged incapacitated person until such time as a permanent guardian could be appointed by the
court. FLA. STAT. § 744.3031 (1989). The preneed guardian could be designated by a competent
adult in the presence of two witnesses to serve in the event of the declarant's incapacity. In a
proceeding for incapacity such a declaration serves as a rebuttable presumption that the preneed
guardian is qualified to serve as guardian. Id. § 744.3045 (1989).
250. Codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 745.41-.52 (Supp. 1990). Committee Substitute for Senate Bill
748 (1990) originally only addressed the surrogacy issue. However, after passage by the Senate,
the House amended the bill to incorporate Committee Substitute for House Bill 2981 (1990),
which addressed aspects of Medicaid, and Committee Substitute for House Bill 2833 (1990),
which broadened the durable power of attorney statute. The bill passed the Senate as amended.
FLA. S. JouR. 941 (Reg. Sess. 1990).
251. Ch. 90-232, § 13, 1990 Fla. Laws 1729 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 745.42(2) (Supp. 1990))
("The designation must be in writing and signed by the person in the presence of two attesting
witnesses, one of who must not be his spouse, a blood relative, an heir to his estate, or responsi-
ble for paying his health care costs.").
252. Id. § 20, 1990 Fla. Laws at 1748 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 745.49 (Supp. 1990)).
253. Id. § 13(3), 1990 Fla. Laws at 1746 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 745.42 (Supp. 1990)).
254. Id. § 21, 1990 Fla. Laws at 1749 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 745.50 (Supp. 1990)). This
probably creates a conflict with § 13(4), which requires a facility to seek a designation when a
surrogate dies or becomes incapable of acting.
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gate in order to avoid potential conflicts of interest.255
Of particular significance was the creation of a procedure for the
designation of a surrogate by the facility if a surrogate had not been
designated or the designated surrogate was unable to act. 256 This was a
new creature because it was outside the concept of a durable power of
attorney and, unlike a guardian, not subject to court supervision (un-
less the selected surrogate is a guardian). As a check, chapter 90-232
included a provision that permitted interested parties to challenge the
surrogate's decision or authority to act.257
If the patient's capacity was in question, the attending physician
and another consulting physician were to evaluate the patient and doc-
ument in the patient's record that the patient lacks capacity. 28 The
patient's incapacity was to be reviewed at least every thirty days by the
attending physician and the surrogate.259 This provision is significant
because the assumption of the surrogate's authority does not depend
upon a court's adjudication of incompetency. Likewise, the termina-
tion of that authority does not depend upon a court to remove an
adjudication of incompetency. The patient may, therefore, immedi-
ately resume responsibility for making health care decisions, and the
surrogate must immediately surrender authority, without a court de-
termination.
Upon the determination of the patient's incapacity and the assump-
tion of the surrogate's authority, the surrogate had final authority to
make health care decisions for the patient. 260 Such decisions must be
in the best interests of the patient and must also be the decision which
the surrogate believes the patient would choose if the patient were ca-
255. Id. § 13, 1990 Fla. Laws at 1746 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 745.42 (Supp. 1990)). An
individual could not serve as a surrogate if he was the treating health care provider or an em-
ployee or relative of the provider, the operator or employee of the facility or a relative of the
operator or employee, or a guardian of the property of the patient but not of the person of the
patient.
This meant that employees of hospitals could not serve as a surrogate for their spouse. This
problem became especially acute after the passage of the Patient Self-Determination Act and the
resulting emphasis on executing advance directives. This is part of the reason for deleting the
restriction in the new Advance Directives Act, chapter 92-199 (1992).
256. Ch. 90-232, § 15, 1990 Fla. Laws 1729 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 745.44 (Supp. 1990)).
The surrogate was to be selected from a prioritized list of persons: (!) a guardian with authority
to make health care decisions if one has been appointed; (2) the patient's spouse; (3) an adult
child of the patient; (4) the parents of the patient; (5) a guardian appointed by the court. Id.
257. Id. § 18, 1990 Fla. Laws at 1748 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 745.47 (Supp. 1990)).
258. Id. § 15, 1990 Fla. Laws at 1746-47 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 745.44 (Supp. 1990)).
259. Id. § 19, 1990 Fla. Laws at 1748 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 745.48 (Supp. 1990)).
260. Id. § 16, 1990 Fla. Laws at 1747 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 745.45 (1)(a) (Supp. 1990)).
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pable of making the decision3.6 This includes the ability to provide
informed consent, to have access to the patient's clinical records and
the authority to release such records, to apply for public benefits and
to have access to information regarding the patient's assets to the ex-
tent necessary to apply for benefits, and to authorize the transfer and
admission of a patient from a facility.2 62 The health care provider was
obligated to provide sufficient information in order to permit the sur-
rogate to make an informed decision. 263 On the other hand, a surro-
gate could not provide consent for abortion, sterilization,
electroshock therapy, psychosurgery, unapproved experimental treat-
ments, voluntary admission to a mental health facility, or the with-
holding or withdrawal of life-prolonging procedures, unless the
patient expressly authorized the surrogate to make such decisions in a
written declaration .264 This last prohibition negated one of the original
motivations for the creation of surrogacy statutes-giving legal au-
thority for a surrogate to authorize the withholding of life-sustaining
procedures. 26 In addition, this prohibition conflicted with the provi-
sions in section 765.02, which stated that the Legislature recognized
the right of a competent adult to designate another to make the deci-
sion to withhold or withdraw life-prolonging procedures, and section
765.07, which permitted a guardian or family member, in consultation
with the physician to make the decision to withhold life support in the
261. Id. § 16, 1990 Fla. Laws at 1747 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 745.45(1)(b) (Supp. 1990))
("The health care surrogate shall ... feixpeditiously consult with appropriate health care provi-
ders to provide informed consent in the best interest of the patient and make health care deci-
sions for the patient which he believes the patient would have made under the circumstances if
the patient were capable of making such decisions.").
This confuses the so-called "best interests" standard and the "substituted judgment" stan-
dard. The former is an objective standard, while the latter is a subjective standard. It is possible
to reconcile the two by requiring a "substituted judgment standard" if possible; otherwise by
requiring a "best interest" standard. See PRasIDNT'S COMM'N, supra note 12, at 132-36. Before
the 1990 version of the bill all previous versions had exclusively applied a substituted judgment
standard. The Florida Supreme Court in both Bludworth and Browning had exclusively relied on
a "substituted judgment" standard with regard to the decision to refuse life-prolonging proce-
dures. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990); John F. Kennedy Memorial
Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984). In Barry, the second district permitted a
"best interests" standard when it was realistically impossible to determine the incompetent pa-
tient's wishes. In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 370 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). In con-
trast, both guardianship and power of attorney law generally require an objective "best
interests" standard. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 744.361(7), .441(2) (Supp. 1990).
This double standard was carried over into the new Advance Directives Act, ch. 92-199, § 3,
1992 Fla. Laws 1839, 1844 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 765.205(l)(b)).
262. Ch. 90-232, § 16, 1990 Fla. Laws 1739, 1747 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 745.45 (Supp.
1990)).
263. Id. § 21, 1990 Fla. Laws at 1748-49 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 745.50 (Supp. 1990)).
264. Id. § 17, 1990 Fla. Laws at 1747-48 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 745.46 (Supp. 1990)).
265. See supra notes 231-37 and accompanying text.
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absence of a living will.26 Most importantly, the prohibition was
probably unconstitutional given the Florida Supreme Court's decision
in Bludworth, which held that the guardian or relatives of the patient
had the authority to exercise an incompetent patient's right to refuse
life-prolonging procedures. 26
The health care surrogate was to retain the ability to make health
care decisions even after the appointment of a guardian of the prop-
erty unless the court removed that power. 2" The health care facility or
provider was absolved from any liability arising from the treatment
decision of a surrogate. Further, the surrogates were absolved from
liability as long as their treatment decisions were made in accordance
with the patient's instructions or based on decisions which the surro-
gate reasonably believed the patient would have made. 269
The initial motivation for amending Florida's durable power of at-
torney statute20 had little to do with creating a procedure for desig-
nating a health care surrogate. Because Florida was the only state to
restrict the assignment of a durable power to a relative of the princi-
pal, 27' the main impetus of proposals seeking to amend section 709.08,
Florida Statutes, was to overcome this restriction. 272 A statute permit-
ting the assignment of a durable power to someone other than a rela-
tive was particularly desirable in Florida because of the large
population of elderly residents without family who wanted to be able
to direct control over their affairs prior to a court adjudication of
incompetency and subsequent appointment of a guardian. Despite nu-
merous attempts to get out from under this "family" limitation, suc-
cess was not achieved until 1990 when Representative Mary
Hawkins273 took up the banner. 274
266. See also FLA. STAT. § 744.3215(4)(f) (Supp. 1990) (a limited guardian to seek court ap-
proval prior to consenting to the termination of life support).
267. The Browning decision clearly made this provision unconstitutional when it created the
proxy procedure. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 13 (Fla. 1990).
268. Ch. 90-232, § 16, 1990 Fla. Laws 1729, 1747 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 745.45(3) (Supp.
1990)). The surrogate's relationship to a plenary guardian is not addressed.
269. Id. § 22, 1990 Fla. Laws at 1749 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 745.51 (Supp. 1990)). Note
that this does not make allowances for decisions made by the surrogate in the patient's best
interests. See supra note 261.
270. FLA. STA-r. § 709.08 (1989).
271. Waters, supra note 249, at 521. The original statute, enacted in 1974, restricted the
assignment to a spouse, parent or child. This was broadened in 1977 to include brothers and
sisters, in 1983 to include nieces and nephews, and again in 1988 to all persons related by lineal
consanguinity, whether natural or adopted. Id.
272. Id.
273. Repub., Naples.
274. See Fla. HB 2833 (1990).
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Included in the Committee Substitute for Representative Hawkins'
bill was a section amending section 709.08, Florida Statutes, to ex-
pressly permit a power of attorney to "include the authority for the
attorney-in-fact to arrange for and consent to medical, therapeutical,
and surgical procedures for the principal, including the administration
of drugs."' 2" This section made clear that the authority of an attor-
ney-in-fact could extend to decisions over medical treatment. Al-
though one district court had held that a durable power grants the
same authority as a guardian, which could include the ability to make
medical decisions, there was no case precedent expressly extending the
durable power to health care decisions. 276 Although the new wording
removed any ambiguity, it also implied that any authority over medi-
cal treatment must now be expressly delegated.
Unfortunately, the durable power in Florida law is subject to sev-
eral restrictions that seriously limit its usefulness as a vehicle for per-
mitting the designation of a surrogate without having to go through
the appointment of a guardian. The Florida statute is revoked by an
adjudication of incompetency, and is suspended when a petition to
determine competency is filed .277 Thus, anyone who disagrees with the
exercise of the durable power can nullify the power simply by filing a
petition for involuntary guardianship. 78 This also means that under
Florida's statute a durable power, unlike a health care surrogacy, can
never co-exist with guardianship.
275. Fla. CS for HB 2833 (1990). Committee Substitute for House Bill 2833 was amended on
to Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 748 (1990) by the House after the Senate bill passed the
Senate. FLA. LEuis., FINAL LEGISLAT vE BIL INFORMATION, REGULAR SESSION 1990, HISTORY OF
HousE BILLS at 439, HB 2833. The Senate bill also contained the Health Care Surrogacy provi-
sions. Fla. SB 748 (1990).
Senate Bill 1888 (1990) (by Senator Dudley) was the Senate companion to House Bill 2833
(1990). Senate Bill 1888 (1990) died in the Senate Committee on Judiciary-Civil. FLA. LEoIS.,
FINAL LEGtsLATIvE BILL INFORMATION, REGULAR SESSION 1990, HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 163,
SB 1888. Senator Dudley also introduced Senate Bill 1090 (1990), which added a new section to
chapter 709, Florida Statutes, creating a "durable health care power of attorney," listing the
powers subject to the attorney-in-fact's authority. Senator George Stuart, Democrat, Orlando,
1978-1990, introduced Senate Bill 3002 (1990), which extensively amended the durable power of
attorney. Much more detailed than Senator Dudley's bill, it provided a procedure for the desig-
nation of a health care surrogate as a form of a durable power of attorney. Senate Bill 3002 died
in the Senate Committee on Judiciary-Civil. FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATrVE BILL INFORMATION,
REGULAR SESSION 1990, HISTORY OF SENATE BaLS at 231, SB 3002.
276. See Waters, supra note 249, at 524 (discussing In re Estate of Schriver, 441 So. 2d 1105
(Fla. 5th DCA 1983)).
277. FLA. STAT. §709.08(2) (1991). (However, subsection (4) permits the continuation of the
durable power during adjudications for incompetency if an emergency arises and a court grants
permission.)
278. See Waters, supra note 249, at 532.
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III. CRUZAN AND THE PATIENT SELF-DETERMINATION ACT
On December 6, 1989, the United States Supreme Court heard oral
argument on the issue of the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment
from a terminally ill patient in the case of Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health.279 Following paramedic resuscitation
after an automobile accident in 1983, Nancy Cruzan was left in a per-
sistent vegetative state, oblivious to her environment.28° Able to
breathe on her own, she received nutrition and hydration through a
gastronomy tube.2 l Realizing after four years that there was no hope
for their daughter, and that with continued medical treatment she
could continue to live another thirty years, 2 2 her family sought to
have the tube removed. 23 A trial court decision granting the parents'
request was overturned by the Missouri Supreme Court, which held
that the family had failed to provide clear and convincing evidence
that Nancy Cruzan would have wanted to have the tube removed.214
The United States Supreme Court, acknowledging a fundamental
right to control decisions relating to one's own body,28' grounded the
right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, including artificially ad-
ministered hydration and nutrition, in the Fourteenth Amendment lib-
erty clause2 rather than a right of privacy. s7 However, the Court
held that a "liberty" interest in being free from unwanted medical
treatment could be subject to state procedural safeguards when that
right was exercised by a surrogate on behalf of an incompetent.2 8 Be-
cause the state's interference was legitimately based on its interest in
the protection and preservation of human life, which is also protected
under the Fourteenth Amendment, and because the consequences of a
decision to forego treatment are usually not subject to correction, the
279. I10S.Ct.2841 (1990).
280. Id. at 2844-45.
281. Id. at 2845.
282. Marcia Coyle, Fast, Furious Questioning Marks Session on Coma Case, NAT'L L.J.,
Dec. 18, 1989, at 8.
283. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2846.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 2851.
286.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
287. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, l10 S. Ct. 2841, 2851 n.7 (1990).
288. Id. at 2851-52.
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Court upheld Missouri's requirement that evidence of a person's de-
sire that life-sustaining procedures be withdrawn meet a "clear and
convincing" standard of proof.28 9
On June 26, 1990, the day after the Cruzan decision, a congres-
sional task force set about redrafting pending legislation 290 to require
providers that receive Medicare and Medicaid to inform patients
about state laws regulating decisions about medical treatment in order
to encourage patients to document in advance what kind of treatment
they would want.2 9' Attached to the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1990, 29 2 the Patient Self-Determination Act became law in No-
vember 1990 and took effect on December 1, 1991.293
The new law294 requires hospitals, nursing homes, hospices, home
health agencies, and health maintenance organizations to provide
written information to each adult patient of the patient's legal rights
under state law (both statutory and judicial) to make decisions con-
cerning medical care, including the right to refuse treatment, and of
the institution's policies respecting the implementation of such
rights. 295 The institution must also document in the patient's medical
record whether the patient has executed an advance directive, ensure
compliance with state law regarding advance directives, and not con-
dition the provision of care on whether or not the patient has executed
an advance directive.2 9 An advance directive meant any written in-
struction, including a living will or durable power of attorney, by an
individual which related to the provision of care when the individual is
incapacitated. In addition, the institution is required (either individu-
ally or with others) to provide for staff and community education on
advance directives. The federal law was careful to accommodate state
laws that allow for objection to advance directives by providers who,
289. Id. at 2852-55.
290. H.R. 5067, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (by Rep. Sander M. Levin), and S. 1766, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (by Sen. John C. Danforth). The legislation was based on a 1989 bill
drafted by Senator Danforth, a Republican from Missouri, Nancy Cruzan's state, and Senator
Daniel Moynihan, a Democrat from New York. See Living Wills Get Boost from the Lawmak-
ers, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 29, 1990, at 33.
291. Joan Biskupic, 'Right to Die, 'Abortion Rulings Spur Calls for Hill Action, CONG. Q.,
June 30, 1990, at 2056.
292. H.R. 5835, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
293. Patient Self-Determination Act, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388, §§ 4206, 4751
(1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc, 1396a (Supp. I 1990)).
294. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc, 1396a(w) (Supp. 11 1990). The Health Care Financing Administra-
tion, Department of Health and Human Services, recently promulgated rules to implement the
new act. See 57 Fed. Reg. 8194 (Mar. 6, 1992) (to take effect Apr. 6, 1992) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. pts. 417, 431, 434, 483, 484, 489, 498).
295. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc, 1396a(w) (Supp. I 1990).
296. Id.
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on the basis of conscience, cannot implement an advance directive.
2 97
The implementation of the Federal Patient Self-Determination Act
added yet another impetus, in addition to the confusion caused by
section 709.08, Florida Statutes (durable power of attorney) and chap-
ter 745 (health care surrogacy), the Browning decision, and chapter
765 (life-prolonging procedures), for revising Florida's varied advance
directive statutes.
IV. WONS AND BROWNING
The Florida Supreme Court's 1989 opinion in Wons v. Public
Health Trust of Dade County29 added an important last ingredient to
Florida's understanding of the right of self-determination as it applied
to decisions concerning medical treatment. Earlier, in Satz v. Perlmut-
ter, the court had held that a competent, terminally ill patient had the
right to refuse medical treatment.2 99 The Wons decision expanded the
right to refuse medical treatment beyond persons who were terminally
ill. The court held that the state must be able to sustain a heavy bur-
den demonstrating a compelling state interest in order to outweigh the
individual's constitutional right of privacy and religious freedom as it
applied to decisions regarding medical treatment choices regardless of
an individual's prospect of recovery.3 t 0
Norma Wons, a Jehovah's Witness and thirty-eight-year-old mother
of two minor children ages twelve and fourteen, was suffering from
extreme blood loss due to uterine bleeding. 0' After she refused a
blood transfusion, the hospital obtained a court order permitting the
hospital to administer the transfusion. Except for the likely possibility
of a recurrence of her condition, the blood transfusion promised to
restore Mrs. Wons to normal health.3ec The Third District Court of
Appeal reversed, holding that even the state's interest in protecting
297. Id. However, it did not require states to make allowances for such objection. "Nothing
in this section shall be construed to prohibit the application of a State law which allows for an
objection on the basis of conscience for any health care provider or any agent of such provider
which as a matter of conscience cannot implement an advance directive." Id. § 1396a(w)(3).
298. 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989), aff'g 500 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). Although Wons
was decided before the Second District decision in Browning, it played a significant role only in
the supreme court's decision. The Second District appeared to feel that Wons would be impor-
tant if the patient's religious or ethical beliefs played a role in the decision to refuse medical
treatment. In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 262 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), aff'd, 568
So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
299. 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
300. Wons, 541 So. 2d at 98.
301. Wons v. Public Health Trust of Dade County, 500 So. 2d 679, 680-81 (Fla. 3d DCA
1987), aff'd, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989).
302. Id.
AD VANCE DIRECTIVES
innocent third parties (the children) did not outweigh Mrs. Wons'
deeply held and constitutionally protected religious belief that blood
transfusions were sinful. 303 Citing Perlmutter, which held that a com-
petent terminally ill patient had a constitutional right to refuse medi-
cal treatment, 0 4 the court reviewed the four state interests that could
serve as grounrls for overcoming an individual's privacy right.3 05 Rely-
ing on its reasoning in St. Mary's Hospital v. Ramsey, which also con-
sidered the right of a Jehovah's Witness to refuse a blood transfusion,
the Third District Court rejected any interest that the state had in the
preservation of life, the prevention of suicide, or the maintenance of
medical integrity.30 6 The Ramsey court had concluded that the state's
interest in the preservation of life must give way to a competent, sick
adult's right to "refuse a transfusion regardless of whether his refusal
to do so arises from fear of adverse reaction, religious belief, recalci-
trance or cost." 0 1' The Ramsey court also found that the state's argu-
ment for preventing suicide inapplicable since the patient did not want
to die .3 1 Finally, the state's interest in preserving the ethical integrity
of the medical profession was held to be inapplicable because medical
ethics recognize a patient's right to refuse medical treatment. 0 9 The
court also noted that medical personnel who accede to the patient's
wishes in refusing medical assistance in these circumstances cannot be
held criminally or civilly liable for their conduct 10
Only the protection of the two minor children gave the Wons court
pause. However, after being assured that the children would be pro-
vided for by other members of the family, the court concluded that
the state cannot mandate a two-parent family if the children will not
be abandoned.3 ' The Florida Supreme Court approved the district
court opinion, holding that preference for a two-parent family could
not override Mrs. Wons' constitutional rights of privacy and religious
freedom.3 12 Both the Third District Court and the supreme court took
303. Id. at 687.
304. Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1980).
305. Wons, 500 So. 2d at 684-85.
306. Id. at 685-87 (citing St. Mary's Hospital v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 4th DCA
1985), aff'd, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989)).
307. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d at 668.
308. Id. at 669.
309. Id. The fact that these three state interests were rejected under these circumstances
make it hard to imagine a situation where the state could triumph unless it could be shown that a
mentally and physically competent individual wished to commit suicide.
310. Id.
311. Wons v. Public Health Trust of Dade County, 500 So. 2d 679, 688 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987),
affd, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989).
312. 541 So. 2d 96, 97 (Fla. 1989).
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the position that the four interests were in the nature of factors to be
used in balancing the societal interests against fundamental individual
rights.3 13 The burden was therefore placed on the hospital to com-
mence court proceedings in order to contest a competent patient's re-
fusal of treatment.3 1 4
In In re Guardianship of Browning, the Second Diitrict Court of
Appeal had certified the following question to the Florida Supreme
Court: "Whether the guardian of a patient who is incompetent but
not in a permanent vegetative state and who suffers from an incura-
ble, but not terminal condition, may exercise the patient's right of
self-determination to forego sustenance provided artificially by a na-
sogastric tube?"3 " ' The Florida Supreme Court answered affirma-
tively, holding that a guardian or otherwise-designated surrogate may
refuse medical treatment (including artificially administered suste-
nance), without court intervention, on behalf of and in conformity
with the previously expressed wishes of a now permanently incompe-
tent patient (who was not necessarily in a persistent vegetative state,
or terminally ill).316
More broadly, the Florida Supreme Court held that because Florida
recognizes a "right of privacy" or self-determination, a person has
the right to make choices pertaining to one's health-including the
right to refuse medical treatment.31 7 This right is triggered not only
when a person has certain religious convictions, or when a person is in
a certain physical condition (such as in a persistent vegetative state or
where death is imminent), or as to certain types of medical treatment
(life-prolonging procedures), but at all times unless the state is able to
demonstrate a compelling interest that overcomes that right. 18 Fur-
ther, that right is not extinguished upon incompetency, but continues
and may be exercised by a designated surrogate or otherwise ap-
pointed person whose decision must be based on the choice that the
patient would have made if the patient had been competent to direct
the course of his or her medical treatment. 1 9
The court found, as had the district court, that chapter 765 did not
apply to Mrs. Browning's situation because sustenance had been ex-
cluded from the category of permissibly withheld life-prolonging pro-
313. Id. at 97; Wons v. Public Health Trust of Dade County, 500 So. 2d 679, 687 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1987).
314. Wons, 541 So. 2d at 98.
315. 543 So. 2d 258, 274 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), aff'd, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
316. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 17.
317. Id. at9-12.
318. Id. at 9-10, 13-14.
319. Id. at 13.
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cedures. 2 0 Having jettisoned any statutory restrictions, the court
explored Mrs. Browning's constitutional right of self-determination."'
Beginning with article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution, the
court stated once again "that everyone has a fundamental right to the
sole control of his or her person." 322 Applying Wons, the court held
that this applies to choices about health care and includes the right to
refuse medical treatment, regardless of medical condition or the type
of medical procedure. 3 ' In an important footnote, the court stated
that it saw no reason to qualify a person's right of self-determination
"on the basis of the denomination of a medical procedure as major or
minor, ordinary or extraordinary, life-prolonging, life-maintaining,
life-sustaining, or otherwise." 312 Thus, the court went further than
simply holding artificial nutrition and hydration to be included within
the category of medical procedures that may be refused. Instead, it
held that, since all medical treatment may be refused, artificial suste-
nance may be refused.325
Relying on Bludworth, the court held that this right is not extin-
guished upon a person's incompetency but continues unabated. 26
However, the court limited the reach of its holding to a specific class
of incompetents by pointing out that "[t]his opinion addresses only
those persons who are mentally and physically incapacitated and are
being sustained by artificial means. We do not address those who are
mentally incapacitated but physically are in good health."'27 This dis-
tinction excluded that category of persons who are mentally incompe-
tent but whose physical health can be restored with appropriate
medical treatment, as well as mentally handicapped persons .1 The ex-
320. Id. at 9 n.5.
321. Id. at 9-12.
322. Id. at 10.
323. Id. at 10-11.
324. Id. at 11 n.6.
325.
We conclude that a competent person has the constitutional right to choose or refuse
medical treatment, and that right extends to all relevant decisions concerning one's
health. Courts overwhelmingly have held that a person may refuse or remove artificial
life-support, whether supplying oxygen by a mechanical respirator or supplying food
and water through a feeding tube. We agree and find no significant legal distinction
between these artificial means of life-support.
Id. at 11-12 (citations omitted).
326. Id. at 12.
327. Id. at 12 n.10 (emphasis added).
328. There may be a problem with how an Alzheimer's, or other similarly situated, patient
fits into this criteria. An Alzheimer's patient's condition is caused by a physical degeneration of
the brain which manifests itself initially not by physical disability but by a loss of mental capac-
ity. During the beginning parts of the disease the person remains physically competent and you
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ercise of an incompetent individual's right to refuse medical treatment
was also limited to instances where the patient was not expected to
regain competency. 29 The court avoided measuring incompetency in
terms of some medically defined physical condition, i.e., comatose or
persistent vegetative state. It was sufficient that "the patient was una-
ble to personally or directly exercise the right to refuse medical treat-
ment. "330 There was no requirement that there be a threshold
determination of whether death is imminent or whether the patient is
terminally ill."'
The court then directed, as in Bludworth, that once it is clear that
the patient cannot direct the course of his or her own medical treat-
ment, a surrogate is authorized to make those decisions for the pa-
tient.3" A surrogate could include a guardian, a relative or even a
close friend. 3 As before, the court directed that the surrogate was to
operate according to the doctrine of substituted judgment.M Because
self-determination is a question of individual freedom, it is not subject
to anyone else's idea of the choice the patient should make or what is
in the patient's best interest. Thus in situations where the patient was
unable to make a decision, the substitute decision maker must make
the choice that the patient would have made. 33 In other words, if a
patient had left instructions, such as a living will, the surrogate is obli-
gated to carry out those instructions. Under this scheme, the instruc-
tions do not operate independently. Instead, they operate through a
would not expect that medical treatment should be withheld. However, a point may be reached
where the Alzheimer's patient refuses to eat. Should artificial nutrition be administered if the
person is otherwise physically competent but ultimate physical degeneration is inevitable?
329. "Before exercising the incompetent's right to forego treatment, the surrogate must
satisfy the following conditions: ... 2. The surrogate must be assured that the patient does not
have a reasonable probability of recovering competency so that the right could be exercised di-
rectly by the patient .... In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 15 (Fla. 1990).
330. Id. at 13.
331. It would appear that the surrogate could decline any medical treatment (life-prolonging
or otherwise) for a hopelessly incapacitated patient, not just the medical procedures that are
artificially sustaining the patient. Thus the surrogate would be able to refuse antibiotics to treat
the pneumonia of a hopelessly incompetent patient.
332. Id. at 13.
333. Id. at 13, 15 n.15. This opinion adds "friends" to the category of persons (guardians
and relatives) that may serve as surrogates. Cf. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Blud-
worth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984).
334. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 13 (Fla. 1990).
335. Id. As stated before, the fact of the locus of the choice to discontinue medical treatment
in the individual is extremely significant in distinguishing a society which respects this choice
from one that permits genocide. While it is possible that this may be abused, it sets up a struc-
ture where the measure of its abuse is not whether the state went too far in deciding whose life is
worth living, but who made the choice, the individual or the state. See supra note 44 and accom-
panying text.
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surrogate because there must be a "decision maker" to determine that
the conditions expressed in the instructions have been met before there
can be a decision to refuse medical treatment.1 6
As before, the court opted to avoid judicial involvement in what is
essentially a private family decision unless called upon to do so.1 7 As
a consequence, the court imposed various restrictions and obligations
on the decision maker depending on the nature of the instructions that
the patient left.33 The court considered two types of instructions: an
oral declaration or written living will directing that life-prolonging
procedures not be administered, or a written designation of a
"proxy" 33 9 to make health care decisions for the patient, including the
336. Some have proposed that a living will is "self-executing" and therefore there is no need
to have a surrogate appointed to carry out the instructions found in a living will. The use of the
word "may" in Browning, 568 So.2d at 15 & n. 15, is cited as evidence of this position.
Text: "In instances when a patient has left instructions, the patient may designate, orally or in
writing, the decision-maker who is to carry out those instructions; but the patient need not do
so." Id. at 15. [The reader is then directed to footnote 15.]
Footnote 15: "As we noted earlier, when a decision-maker has not been designated, a close
family member or friend may carry out the patient's instructions." Id. at 15 n. 15.
The self-executing proponents argue that the words "need not do so" and "may" mean that it
is discretionary whether or not a surrogate is appointed. The author believes that "need not do
so" means that the living will is not invalidated because a surrogate has not been appointed, and
that one may be appointed from among the group of close family member, friend, or guardian.
The word "may" is used only to give discretion as to who is selected as the surrogate.
Both Browning and Bludworth make clear that the wishes of the incompetent patient are to be
carried out by a surrogate decision maker who is obligated to carry out the patient's instructions
expressed either orally or in writing. Browning, 568 So. 2d 4; Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921. The
entire structure of the Browning opinion assumes the designation of a surrogate; for example,
including the procedure that a surrogate is to follow when carrying out the instructions of a
patient. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 15.
337. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 15.
338. Id. at 14-16.
339. The court has inadvertently caused a great deal of confusion in its use of the words
"surrogate" and "proxy." The word "surrogate" is used to mean persons who have been desig-
nated to carry out a person's specific instructions with regard to the administration of life-sus-
taining procedures either in an oral declaration or a written living will. Id. at 15.
The word "proxy," on the other hand, is used to refer to a person specifically designated by
the individual to make health care decisions when no specific instructions have been given. Id.
The court is using the word "proxy" the way "surrogate" is commonly used in most articles
on the subject and in most surrogacy statutes including chapter 745, Florida Statutes (1991). In
addition, most living will statutes (including Florida's at the time of the Browning decision) do
not provide for the designation of a surrogate to carry out the instructions of the declarant as
presented in the living will. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 13 (Fla. 1990).
In drafting the present statute, it was decided to use the word "surrogate" to apply to both
surrogates and proxies as used by the court. This was done for several reasons: first, because it
was believed that this would cause less confusion since the word "surrogate" had already been
used this way in Florida in chapter 745, and second, because the modern drift is to see a living
will as nothing more than a specific instruction to a surrogate. The word "proxy" was instead
reserved for situations where the patient has neither left written instructions nor designated a
surrogate to make health care decisions on his behalf. See ch. 92-199, § 5, 1992 Fla. Laws 1839
(to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 765.401).
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decision to forego medical treatment.34° "
When the incompetent patient has executed a living will or has
made an oral declaration expressing instructions as to the application
of medical treatment, a surrogate, either designated by the patient
(orally or in writing), or appointed from amongst the patient's family
or friends, must satisfy certain conditions before the decision is made
to forego medical treatment. 4' The surrogate must be satisfied that (1)
the oral or written declaration is reliable, 42 (2) the patient is unlikely
to recover sufficient competency to make the decision themselves, and
(3) any conditions in the declaration have been considered and satis-
fied .34 Further, the surrogate must be able to support with clear and
convincing evidence that the decision to forego medical treatment is
the one the patient would have made.3M4 Because the court awards the
presumption of clear and convincing evidence to written instructions,
this is no problem when there is a living will. While oral statements
may amount to clear and convincing evidence, they do not carry the
presumption that written evidence does.34 However, by giving express
recognition to oral, as well as written declarations, the court avoids
the implication that the failure to execute a living will means that a
patient does not wish life support to be withheld. Further, it gives a
surrogate the authority to act on the basis of other expressions of the
patient's intent in addition to a written living will.
The court's assignment of an evidentiary role to living wills is sig-
nificant. The legal status of living wills has always been uncertain. 34
What is legally enforceable, indeed constitutionally required, is that a
person's desires with respect to the administration of certain medical
treatment be respected. A living will serves as the best evidence of that
intent when the person is unable to personally direct the course of
medical care. By placing the living will on an evidentiary continuum,
the court is not only assigning a legal status to living wills but at the
340. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 15. The court found support for this idea in Justice O'Con-
nor's concurring opinion in Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2857
(1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring). See Browning, 568 So. 2d at 15 n.14.
The Browning court did not address the situation where the patient has left neither written nor
oral instructions nor designated another to make the decision for the patient (i.e., In re
Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Superintendent of Belchertown
State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977)).
341. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 15.
342. This requirement is unnecessary for written declarations because the court assigns a
presumption that a written declaration has the status of clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 16.
343. Id. at 15.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 16.
346. See MEISEL, supra note 161, § 10.7.
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same time is creating a place for other evidence of a person's intent,
such as an oral declaration.1
7
A proxy, who must be designated in writing, must be satisfied that
(1) the written proxy designation is reliable,3 48 and (2) the patient is
unlikely to recover competency and therefore will be unable to make
the decision for him- or herself. 49 A written designation of a proxy
provides a presumption of clear and convincing evidence of the prox-
y's designation.5 0
In determining the patient's incompetency or whether a specific
medical condition exists, the surrogate or proxy must obtain certifi-
cates (affidavits, sworn statements, or depositions) from the patient's
primary physician and at least two other physicians with specialties
relevant to the patient's condition. 351 Such certificates provide a re-
buttable presumption of both the patient's incompetency and that the
proscribed conditions exist. 352
As before, the court left itself open to resolve questions about the
patient's instructions or wishes, or challenges to the surrogate/proxy's
decision to refuse medical treatment. 3 To facilitate this process, the
court asked the Probate and Guardianship Committee of The Florida
Bar to develop a rule establishing a procedure for expedited judicial
intervention in these type of situations.3 5 4
The court approached Mrs. Browning's living will as a particular set
of instructions and conditions that were to be discharged by the deci-
sion maker, which in this case was Mrs. Herbert, the court-appointed
guardian."' The court noted that while Mrs. Browning could have
simply stated that "she wanted to refuse any and all efforts to artifi-
cially prolong her life," her wishes were conditional: Mrs. Browning's
living will required that her condition be "terminal" and her death
347. This perspective would make unnecessary the requirements in chapter 92-199, § 2, 1992
Florida Laws 1495 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 765.103 & 765.112), which expressly give
recognition to advance directives executed prior to the effective date of the Act or which are
executed in other jurisdictions. Such advance directives would have automatic legal status as
evidence of a person's intent regardless of when or where they were executed.
348. For the same reasons stated in note 342, supra, this should be unnecessary because the
court has already assigned a presumption of clear and convincing evidence to a written designa-
tion of a proxy.
349. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 15-16 (Fla. 1990).
350. Id. at 16.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 16 n.17. Florida Probate Rule 5.900 was adopted by the supreme court on August
22, 1991. In re Amendments to the Fla. Probate Rules, 584 So. 2d 964, 992 (Fla. 1991).
355. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 17 (Fla. 1990).
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"imminent.' 35 6 Because there was no hope that Mrs. Browning would
recover, the court concluded that the "terminal" condition was
met.357 And because death would result following the removal of the
nasogastric tube, death could be considered "imminent.' '358
Relative to the statutory scheme presented in chapter 765 at the time
of the Browning decision, the court has bypassed the more trouble-
some provisions in the Life-Prolonging Procedures Act. First, by
eliminating the requirement that the patient be terminally ill, the court
avoids the quagmire implicit in a determination of imminence of
death. Second, by focusing on the right to refuse all medical treat-
ment, the court not only avoids having to distinguish artificial nutri-
tion and hydration from other life-support procedures, but also
having to distinguish life-prolonging procedures from other forms of
medical treatment. Third, the court avoids the need for physiologi-
cally based definitions and demonstrations of incompetency (e.g., per-
sistent vegetative state, brain dead) by instead permitting a surrogate
to assume authority to refuse medical treatment when the patient is
unable to personally direct or communicate medical decisions and un-
likely to regain that ability. Fourth, the court incorporates the concept
of a surrogate into the living will framework to act as the incompetent
person's agent in executing the person's instructions as expressed in
the living will or other written or oral declaration. Finally, the court
defines the legal role of living wills by placing them on an evidentiary
continuum, so that properly executed living wills provide clear and
convincing evidence of a person's wishes with respect to medical treat-
ment in situations where the person is no longer able to direct his or
her medical care.
V. THE 1992 ACT, CHATER 92-199
The needs to combine chapters 745 and 765 and section 709.08 and
to create consistency with chapter 744, plus the new federal mandate
of the Patient Self-Determination Act, and the Florida Supreme
Court's opinion in Browning were the main issues that needed to be
addressed by the Legislature. This was not accomplished until the
1992 session. Although there were some attempts to deal with the
356. Id. at 16-17.
357. Id. at 17.
358. Id. This definition of "imminent" is identical to the one preferred by the district court
when it selected the second definition of terminal to mean a condition such that the patient
would die without the administration of life-support. See In re Guardianship of Browning, 543
So. 2d 258, 265 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), affd, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990). The court is now free to
apply it because the court's holding, unlike the statute, does not distinguish artificial sustenance
from any other medical procedure.
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overlap between chapter 745 and section 709.08, 311 the Browning deci-
sion was the main focus of the 1991 session.36 And like the later 1992
effort, controversy centered around the definition of "terminal condi-
tion" and pressure to create a so-called "conscience clause.' '361
The Supreme Court in Browning had held that a surrogate, as the
lawfully appointed or designated decision maker, had the authority,
within the limits expressed by the patient, to refuse all medical treat-
ment for a patient who was both physically and mentally incompetent,
sustained by artificial means, and certified by three doctors as highly
unlikely to regain competency. 6 2 Nothing else was required. Chapter
765 (1989), on the other hand, required that before life-prolonging
procedures could be withheld or withdrawn the patient had to be in a
terminal condition,3 63 which meant that death was imminent. 3'" In ad-
dition, the 1990 legislation regulating the withholding of artificial sus-
tenance provided that artificial nutrition and hydration could only be
withdrawn if the patient had expressly requested it in a living will and
the patient's relatives offered no objection.3 65
Despite the above, the Legislature found itself heavily embroil-
ed in precisely the controversy the Browning opinion had cir-
cumvented. Looking first at the 1991 session, House Bill 1039 started
out by creating two categories of conditions that would permit
withholding or withdrawing life support:3 66 a "terminal condi-
359. Chiefly, Representative Peggy Simone's, Republican, Bradenton, 1982-1992, House Bill
2203 (1991), which would have repealed chapter 745 and enlarged chapter 709 by creating a
durable power of attorney for health care. Florida Senate Bill 2012 (1991) by Senator Mary
Grizzle, Republican, Belleau Shore, House 1963-1978, Senate, 1978-1992, was an identical Sen-
ate companion.
There was also a provision in Florida Senate Bill 2136 (1991), which repealed the provision in
Section 709.08 expressly permitting a durable power of attorney to apply to medical treatment.
360. Despite intense effort, no bills addressing this issue were passed in the 1991 session.
361. Also controversial during the 1991 session was the addition of "close personal friend"
to the category of potential decision makers as had been permitted by the Browning decision. In
re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 13, 15 n.IS (Fla. 1990). This provision was success-
fully removed by Representative Keith Arnold, Democrat, Fort Myers, during House considera-
tion. FLA. H.R. JouR. 457 (Reg. Sess. 1991).
362. "Today we hold that, without prior judicial approval, a surrogate or proxy, as provided
here, may exercise the constitutional right of privacy for one who has become incompetent and
who, while competent, expressed his or her wishes orally or in writing." Browning, 568 So. 2d at
17.
363. FLA. STAT. § 765.07 (1989).
364. Id. § 765.03(6) ("Terminal condition" means a condition caused by injury, disease, or
illness from which, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, there can be no recovery and
which makes death imminent.).
365. Id. § 765.075 (Supp. 1990).
366. Florida House Bill 1039, § 6 (1991), proposed amending § 765.07(1), Florida Statutes
(1989), to read: "Life-prolonging procedures may be withheld or withdrawn from an adult pa-
tient with a terminal condition or in a persistent vegetative state ......
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tion"3 67 and a "persistent vegetative state. ' ' 36 The Committee Substi-
tute combined the two so the definition of "terminal condition"
included a "persistent vegetative state. '3 69 However, the modified def-
inition also contained a new category: "incurable affliction." The
fear was this would permit withholding treatment from patients with
"incurable afflictions" that would result in death without treatment
but could be functionally cured with treatment (i.e., asthma, diabetes,
blood transfusions, etc.).3 70 What the Legislature overlooked was the
additional requirement in Browning that the patient be both physically
and mentally incapacitated and not expected to recover. Provided that
the patient was not suffering from some other uncorrectable condi-
tion, application of medication for asthma, insulin for diabetes, or a
blood transfusion for Norma Wons would restore physical compe-
tency and withholding such treatment from mentally incompetent pa-
tients would not be permitted.37'
The Senate bill, on the other hand, simply replaced the phrase
"makes death imminent" in the definition of "terminal condition"
367.
Terminal condition means a condition of incurable affliction caused by injury, dis-
ease, or illness from which, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, there can be
no recovery and in which the application of life-prolonging procedures will not, within
a reasonable degree of medical certainty, alter or reverse the patient's deterioration.
Fla. HB 1039, § 3 (1991).
Note the addition of the term "incurable affliction." This term seems to have been taken from
In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 14 (Fla. 1990), where it is mentioned several
times. Note also the substitution of "makes death imminent" with "alter or reverse the patient's
deterioration." The Committee Substitute for House Bill 1039 struck the old definition and fo-
cused only on these two new additions.
368. "Persistent vegetative state means the absence of cognitive behavior and the inability to
communicate or interact purposefully, determined within a reasonable degree of medical cer-
tainty to be permanent and irreversible." Fla. HB 1039, § 3 (1991).
Although there was a certain progress in being able to terminate the life support of persons in
a persistent vegetative state, it was ironic that this definition still could not accommodate a per-
son such as Mrs. Browning who was neither comatose nor in a persistent vegetative state, and
whose life was theoretically indefinitely sustainable.
369.
"[T]erminal condition" means any of the following from which, to a reasonable de-
gree of medical certainty, there can be no recovery, as determined in writing by the
attending physician and one other physician with a specialty relevant to the patient's
condition, and includes:
(a) An incurable affliction;
(b) A persistent vegetative state; or
(c) A degenerative condition which causes death.
Fla. CS for HB 1039, § 3 (1991).
370. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health Care, Subcomm. on Health Standards, tape recording of
proceedings (Mar. 12, 1991) (on file with comm.) (discussing the definition of terminal condition
in HB 1039).
371. See supra notes 327-29 and accompanying text.
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with "will result in the patient's death.""' 2 A separate definition
identical to House Bill 1039 was included for "persistent vegetative
state.""' The battle continued on the floor of the House and Senate.
On the House floor, Representative Susan Guber37 4 offered a "strike
everything after the enacting clause" amendment to the House bill" 5
which, although it otherwise closely resembled the Senate bill,"76 con-
tained an abbreviated definition of the House version for "terminal
condition. 3 77 Short-lived, a definition for terminal condition identical
to the Senate's was subsequently adopted, including the addition of a
separate definition for "persistent vegetative state. 3 7 Upon Senate
consideration and after passage by the House, the definitions were al-
tered again, this time incorporating the Senate Committee Substitute
alternative"9 which defined "terminal condition" to include a "per-
sistent vegetative state. "30
The second major area of controversy, the "conscience clause, "',
372. Fla. SB 2136, § 18, & CS for SB 2136, § 16 (1991) ("Terminal condition means a condi-
tion caused by injury, disease, or illness from which, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty,
there can be no recovery and which will result in the patient's death.").
373. Id. The Judiciary Committee's second Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 2136 com-
bined the two by stating that "terminal condition" referred to both even though they were de-
fined separately. Fla. CS for SB 2136 (1991).
374. Sponsor of the House bill.
375. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 412 (Reg. Sess. 1991).
376. Senate Bill 2136 was much more comprehensive than the House bill. It also sought to
amend chapter 745, the Surrogacy Act, to bring it in line with the Browning decision, amend
chapter 401, regulating emergency medical technicians and paramedics, to permit recognition of
requests to withhold life-prolonging procedures, and amend § 709.08 to direct that durable pow-
ers of attorney with authority to consent to medical treatment come under the provisions of
chapter 745. Fla. SB 2136 (proposed amendment to FLA. STAT. § 709.08).
Representative Guber's floor amendment also contained the amendments to chapter 745, but
not the sections relating to emergency medical treatment or amending section 709.08.
377.
"Terminal condition" means either of the following conditions from which, to a rea-
sonable degree of medical certainty, there can be no recovery, as determined in writing
by the attending physician and one other physician with a specialty relevant to the
patient's condition:
A persistent vegetative state; or
An incurable affliction which causes death.
FIA. H.R. JOUR. 414 (Reg. Sess. 1991).
378. Id. at 457.
379. Senator Malchon also offered a "strike everything after the enacting clause" amend-
ment to House Bill 1039 which was identical to the second Committee Substitute for Senate Bill
2136. FLA. S. JoUR. 939 (Reg. Sess. 1991). This version of Senate Bill 2136 also contained the
provision amending chapters 745 and 401.
380. "'Terminal Condition' means a condition caused by injury, disease, or illness from
which, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, there can be no recovery and which will
result in the patient's death, and the term includes a persistent vegetative state." FLA. S. JoUR.
941 (Reg. Sess. 1991).
381. See H.R. Comm. on Health Care, Subcomm. on Health Standards, tape recording of
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sought to allow health care providers or facilities to avoid carrying out
instructions to withdraw or withhold life-prolonging procedures on
the basis of moral or ethical beliefs. The justification for the provision
was the section in the Federal Patient Self-Determination Act which
made allowances for state laws that permitted objection to implement-
ing an advance directive on the basis of conscience. 82 If the provider
refused a request to discontinue treatment because of the provider's
belief that such decisions were "morally" wrong, such a clause could
potentially permit a provider to obstruct a person's constitutional
right to direct that medical treatment not be administered. The consti-
tutional issue would not be implicated, however, where there was a
legitimate concern that a decision was made for the convenience of the
decision maker instead of in conformity with the patient's instructions
or where statutorily or judicially imposed procedures were not being
followed.
Section 765.09, Florida Statutes (1989), permitted the attending
physician of a terminally ill patient to transfer the patient to another
physician. However, there was no statutory obligation for the physi-
cian to carry out the patient's instruction as expressed in a living
will.383 Before floor discussion, neither the House nor the Senate bill
proposed significant amendments to this section other than to permit
the surrogate to transfer a patient in order to comply with the pa-
tient's instruction.3as Because of the potential to thwart the patient's
instructions, a House floor amendment was proposed and adopted
that required the health care provider to carry out the instructions of
the patient if all transfer efforts failed.3"5 In addition, any transfer
proceedings (Mar. 12, 1991) (on file with comm.) (testimony of Tom Horkan discussing HB
1039).
382. "Nothing in subsections (a) and (b) shall be construed to prohibit the application of a
State law which allows for an objection on the basis of conscience for any health care provider
or any agent of such provider which, as a matter of conscience, cannot implement an advance
directive." Act of Nov. 5, 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4206, 104 STAT. 1388-116.
383. "An attending physician who refuses to comply with the declaration of a qualified pa-
tient, or the treatment decision of a person designated to make the decision by the declarant in
his declaration or pursuant to s. 765.07, shall make a reasonable effort to transfer the patient to
another physician." FLA. STAT. § 765.09 (1991). While there may have been no statutory obliga-
tion, there was clearly a constitutional obligation.
384. See Fla. SB 2136 (1991), CS for SB 2136, second CS for SB 2136, and Rep. Guber's
floor amendment to CS for HB 1039.
385.
Nothing contained in this chapter is intended to require any provider of medical care
to commit any act which is against his moral or ethical beliefs. In the event that a
health care provider cannot carry out the wishes of the declarant in accordance with
this section, he shall make reasonable effort to transfer the patient to another health
care provider. If efforts to provide for transfer fail the health care provider shall carry
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expenses were to be borne by the health care provider. 86 Upon Senate
consideration, Senator Malchon's "strike everything after the enact-
ing clause" amendment to the House bill essentially contained the ver-
sion passed by the House.387 However, an amendment to Senator
Malchon's amendment was proposed and adopted by the Senate
which basically returned the section to its original provision. 88
The proposed 1991 legislation also sought to incorporate the
Browning holding that "sustenance" was no longer to be differenti-
ated from other life-prolonging procedures by repealing section
765.075389 and amending the definition of life-prolonging procedure to
remove all references to the word "sustenance." 319 No effort was
made, however, to repeal or alter the definition for life-prolonging
procedures to conform to the court's holding, which permitted a sur-
rogate to refuse all medical treatment for patients in a permanently
incapacitated condition. Nor was the 1990 addition to the living will
form that required the declarant to expressly elect not to have artifi-
cial nutrition and hydration administered removed from the living will
form.3 9' Indeed, the Committee Substitute for House Bill 1039 elabo-
rated upon that election by adding the additional option to have, or
not have, nutrition and hydration withheld only when death was im-
minent. 392
out the wishes of the declarant pursuant to the decision of the Florida Supreme Court
in the case of Florida versus Doris F. Herbert, case number 74-174, dated September
13, 1990. All expenses relating to such transfer shall be born by the health care pro-
vider.
FIA. H.R. JOUR. 457 (Reg. Sess. 1991).
386. Id.
387.
This chapter does not require any provider of medical care to commit any act that is
against his moral or ethical beliefs. If a health care provider or health care facility
cannot carry out the wishes of the declarant in accordance with this chapter, the pro-
vider or the facility shall make reasonable efforts to transfer the declarant to another
health care provider or health care facility. If efforts to provide for transfer fail, the
health care provider shall carry out the wishes of the declarant. All expenses directly
relating to such transfer shall be borne by the health care provider or health care
facility whose refusal to comply with the declarant's wishes necessitates the transfer.
FA. S. JOUR. 942 (Reg. Sess. 1991).
388. Taken from Florida Senate Bill 2136 (1991). "A health care surrogate appointed under
chapter 745 may transfer the patient as provided in s. 745.45(2). A health care surrogate or any
other health care designee may transfer as necessary to comply with the patient's expressed in-
structions regarding withholding or withdrawing of life-prolonging procedures." FLA. S. JOUR.
943 (Reg. Sess. 1991).
389. Created by ch. 90-223, § 12, 1990 Fla. Laws 1643.
390. All versions of the section now read as it had when first proposed in 1984, before suste-
nance had been inserted: "The phrase 'life-prolonging procedure' does not include the adminis-
tration of medication or performance of any medical procedure deemed necessary to provide
comfort care or to alleviate pain." Id. § 1, 1990 Fla. Laws at 1644.
391. FLA. STAT. § 765.05(1) (Supp. 1990).
392. Fla. CS for HB 1039, § 4 (1991). This highlights a current controversy in the practice of
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In addition to these concerns, the 1991 Legislature was unified in its
decision to maintain the two-physician,3 93 rather than the Bludworth
and Browning three-physician, certification of the patient's condi-
tion.394 Given all the other restrictions placed on the decision to with-
hold life-support, it was considered unnecessarily burdensome and
costly to both the family and facility to be required to obtain the writ-
ten certification of three rather than two physicians. 95 Because the
1991 legislative effort failed to clear both chambers, ultimate resolu-
tion was left to the 1992 session.
The House 1992 legislative effort was the combined endeavor of the
House Committee on Health Care, chaired by Representative Elaine
Bloom,396 which focused on life-prolonging procedures and living
wills; the House Judiciary Committee, which focused on health care
surrogacy and guardianship considerations; and the Health Law Sec-
tion of The Florida Bar, which contributed a format for combining
the parts. The Senate effort was centered in the Health and Rehabili-
tative Services Committee and Senator Malchon.3 9
designing living wills. Should they be as general as possible-simply expressing the patient's in-
tent that heroic measures not be imposed, allowing a person to die naturally? Or should a living
will contain great detail, specifically naming each medical procedure that a person may or may
not want performed? The latter carries the danger of not being able to accommodate new or
unlisted procedures by implying that if a person has not named a form of treatment then they
must not object to it. The designation of a health care surrogate to make just such decisions
avoids this problem.
393. "'Qualified patient' means a patient who has made a declaration in accordance with ss.
765.01-765.15 and who has been diagnosed and certified in writing by the attending physician,
and by one other physician who has examined the patient, to be afflicted with a terminal condi-
tion." FLA. STAT. § 765.03(5) (Supp. 1990).
The resolution of this conflict depends on whether three physicians are required to insure that
the patient's constitutional right of self-determination is protected. If not, then the determina-
tion of number of physicians would be a procedural issue within the domain of the Legislature,
subject to other practical concerns in addition to the protection of the patient. See In re Guardi-
anship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), aff'd, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
394. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 16. See also Fla. CS for HB 1039, §§ 3, 6 (1991) & SB 2136, §
22 (1991).
395. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health Care, Subcomm. on Health Standards, tape recording of
proceedings (Mar. 12, 1991) (on file with comm.) (comm. discussion of HB 1039).
396. Dem., Miami Beach.
397. Florida Senate Bill 1096 was a massive rewrite of chapters 745 and 765. Florida House
Bill 1311, by Representative Mary Brennan, Democrat, Pinellas Park, a House companion to
Senate Bill 1096, was filed but never taken up by the Health Care Committee. Florida Senate Bill
2414 by Senator John A. Grant, Republican, Tampa, was The Florida Bar draft. After journey-
ing through the Senate Health and Rehabilitative Services Committee, both bills were combined
in the Senate Judiciary Committee as Committee Substitutes for Committee Substitute for Com-
mittee Substitute for Senate Bill 1096 and Senate Bill 2414. House Bill 1851 was substituted for
Committee Substitutes for Committee Substitute for Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 1096
and Senate Bill 2413 on the Senate floor. FLA. S. JouR. 877 (Reg. Sess. 1992).
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Initially, the House Health Care Committee, like the Senate Health
and Rehabilitative Services Committee in 1991 and 1992, examined
both chapter 745 and chapter 765 with an emphasis only on incorpo-
rating the Browning decision into the present statutory framework.
However, due to considerable interest on the part of The Florida
Bar,398 the Florida Hospital Association, and the Florida Catholic
Conference, an increased emphasis was placed on combining the vari-
ous sections and chapters for the purpose of creating a unified ap-
proach toward advance directives.3 Chapters 765 and 745 were then
divided between the Health Care and Judiciary Committees. The
Health Care Committee focused exclusively on revising life-prolong-
ing procedures to create consistency with Browning;w the Judiciary
Committee took up Representative Peggy Simone's House Bill 39,
which repealed chapter 745, health care surrogacy,4°' and created in its
place a durable power of attorney for health care within chapter
709.0 2 The Health Care Committee's House Bill 1851, first taken up
on the floor on January 30, 1992, 401 addressed only the revision of
chapter 765, life-prolonging procedures. House Bill 1851 was then
combined with House Bill 39 within the format provided by The Flor-
ida Bar and adopted as a floor amendment to House Bill 1851 on a
third reading.4 This was the version sent to the Senate.
The Florida Bar's draft of the bill would have repealed chapter 745,
renamed chapter 765 "Advance Directives," and divided chapter 745
into four parts. The first part applied to general provisions, including
a statement of intent and definitions. The second part applied to dura-
ble power of attorney procedures. The third part regulated the execu-
tion and enforcement of living wills. The fourth part provided a
procedure for appointing a "proxy" to make health care decisions for
an incompetent patient in the absence of a living will or the appoint-
ment of a surrogate.45
398. See R. Andrew Rock, Chair's Report-Health Law Section Proposed Amendments to
Life-Prolonging Procedures Act, 3 FLA. B.-HEALTH L. SECT. NEWSL. (Fla. Bar, Tallahassee,
Fla.), Nov./Dec. 1990, at 1.
399. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health Care, Subcomm. on Health Standards, tape recording of
proceedings (Sept. 12, 1991) (on file with comm.) (discussing PCB HB 92-01). Florida Hospice,
Inc. and the Florida Association of Homes for the Aging also contributed to this legislative
initiative.
400. These changes were incorporated into Florida House Bill 1851 (1992).
401. See FLA. STAT. § ch. 745.
402. Fla. HB 39 (1992). This was identical to Representative Simone's Committee Substitute
for House Bill 2203 (1991). See supra note 359.
403. FLA. H.R. Jou,. 179 (Reg. Sess. 1992).
404. Fla. HB 1851 (1992) (First engrossed). FLA. H.R. JoUR. 603-09 (Reg. Sess. 1992).
405. See supra note 398.
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Regardless of the approach the same issues continued to dominate
the dialogue, i.e., the definition of "terminal condition," and the
"conscience clause." Other controversial issues included withholding
or withdrawing life-prolonging procedures from terminally ill preg-
nant patients, as well as the ability of a surrogate to give consent to
abortion, sterilization, electroshock therapy, psychosurgery, or experi-
mental treatments.
Probably the best definition of "terminal condition," in the sense
that it was truest to the Browning decision, was the definition pro-
posed during the September 1991 meeting of the House Health Care
Committee's Subcommittee on Health Standards.4°6 This definition
focused on the requirement that the patient be both mentally and
physically incapacitated and unlikely to recover competency. The sub-
sequent definition that was incorporated into House Bill 1851, and
remained the House proposal until the final days of the legislative ses-
sion, focused on the requirement that the patient's life was being arti-
ficially sustained by defining terminal to mean that a person would die
without the administration of life-prolonging procedures. This latter
definition was similar to the definition suggested by the district court's
Browning decision4°8 and the Florida Supreme Court's construction of
the terms in Mrs. Browning's living will.4 Combined with the re-
quirement that the designated decision maker determine that the pa-
tient was unlikely to recover competency, this was believed to satisfy
the restrictions in Browning. Both definitions avoided having to ad-
dress the "imminent death" issue and had the advantage of being able
to incorporate a person in a persistent vegetative state or a semi-cogni-
tive state such as Mrs. Browning without having to specifically define
the physical condition.
406. "'Terminal Condition' means a condition in which a person is mentally and physically
incompetent and is caused by injury, disease, or illness from which, to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty, there can be no recovery." Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health Care, PCB 92-01, §
I I (draft of Sept. 20, 1991).
407. "'Terminal condition' means a condition caused by injury, disease, or illness from
which there is no reasonable medical probability of recovery and where death would result fol-
lowing the withholding or withdrawal of life-prolonging procedures." Fla. HB 1851, § 3 (1992).
Note the replacement of the term "reasonable degree of medical certainty" with "no reasona-
ble medical probability." The latter phrase is used throughout the Browning decision and was
felt to avoid the awkwardness of the former with the same effect. This phrase was exchanged
throughout the statute.
408. In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 264-65 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), aff'd, 568
So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990); see also supra notes 187, 195, and accompanying text.
409. Browning, 568 So. 2d 4; see also supra notes 356-58 and accompanying text.
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As before, this definition was unsatisfactory to the Florida Catholic
Conference, which still feared that this would permit medical treat-
ment to be withheld from diabetics or other persons suffering from
potentially treatable conditions.410 Even with the now-included Brown-
ing provision that the patient must be physician-certified to be perma-
nently incompetent, and the additional limitation that the surrogate
could only consent to the withholding or withdrawal of life-prolong-
ing procedures which were defined as procedures that served only to
prolong the process of dying, the definition was still not acceptable.4"
The definition for terminal condition proposed by The Florida Bar
was almost identical to the last version of 1991's House Bill 1039. This
was the version which defined terminal condition to mean both a con-
dition which would "inevitably result in death" and a "persistent
410. See Letter from Tom Horkan, Florida Catholic Conference, to Representative Elaine
Bloom, Florida House of Representatives (Jan. 6, 1992) (discussing House Bill 1191) (The House
bill was mistakenly filed in Representative Bloom's name rather than in the Health Care Com-
mittee's name so it had to be withdrawn and was ref'led as House Bill 1851.).
While the Catholic Church is not opposed to withholding or withdrawing life-prolonging pro-
cedures in hopeless cases or where the procedures are unduly burdensome, the Florida Catholic
Conference would prefer that decisions to withhold life-prolonging treatment be made on a case-
by-case basis rather than in conformity with formulas or definitions provided by statute. Such
formulas or definitions do not necessarily conform to the Catholic emphasis on the preservation
of life over sometimes conflicting individual's wishes (i.e., Elizabeth Bouvia). For example, the
church still remains wedded to the distinction between "ordinary" and "extraordinary" treat-
ment and that death be "imminent" before medical efforts can be abandoned. The differentia-
tion between "ordinary" and "extraordinary" highlights the permissibility of withdrawing only
medical treatment which is clearly more of a burden on the patient than a benefit. The require-
ment that death be "imminent" ensures that the patient's death is the inevitable result of his or
her illness rather than of any affirmative act. Consequently, court opinions and statutes which
abandon such distinctions permitting a surrogate to refuse medical treatment once a threshold
state of permanent mental and physical incapacity is reached would be unacceptable. See Fioa-
IDA CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, LIFE, DEATH & THE TREATMENT OF DYING PATIENTs-A PASTORAL
STATEMENT OF THE CATHOLIC BISHOPS OF FLORIDA (Apr. 27, 1989); see also Peter Steinfels, Bish-
ops Warn Against Withdrawing Life Supports, N.Y. Tnas, Apr. 3, 1992, at A10 (discussing the
church's concern over withdrawing food and liquid from irreversibly unconscious patients except
when such procedures are obviously futile and burdensome).
411. "'Life-prolonging procedure' means any medical procedure, treatment, or intervention
which:
(a) Utilize mechanical or other artificial means to sustain, restore, or supplant a spontaneous
vital function and
(b) When applied to a patient in a terminal condition, serves only to prolong the process of
dying."
FLA. STAT. § 765.03(3) (1991). Although this same definition of "life-prolonging procedure" is
incorporated into chapter 92-199, it is inconsistent with the Browning decision which permits the
surrogate of a permanently incompetent patient to refuse all medical treatment, not just life-
prolonging procedures.
352 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 20:291
vegetative state. ' 412 The Senate definition, which is basically the defi-
nition that prevailed, was similar with the addition of a physiological
description of a persistent vegetative state. 413 As noted, these defini-
tions still would not have permitted the termination of medical treat-
ment from someone such as Estelle Browning who was neither
comatose nor in a persistent vegetative state. 41 4
Although first efforts to amend the House definition of terminal
condition on the House floor were unsuccessful, 415 the bill ultimately
sent to the Senate contained the Senate definition. 416 Because the
amendment offered by Representative John Cosgrove 417 left out the
word "and" between the conditions defining a "persistent vegetative
state," a second opportunity was offered to clean up the definition to
remove redundancy and make the terminology consistent with the rest
of House Bill 1851.418
Ironically, following the Senate rejection of Senator Fred Dudley's
amendment to reinsert the word "imminent" into the definition of
412.
"Terminal Condition" means a condition caused by injury, disease, or illness, from
which, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, there can be no recovery and
which will inevitably result in death, or a persistent vegetative state.
"Persistent vegetative state" means a condition which causes, within a reasonable
degree of medical certainty, the absence of cognitive behavior and inability to commu-
nicate or interact purposefully with the environment, and which is, to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty, permanent and irreversible.
Proposed Amendments to Life-Prolonging Procedures Act § 2 (Health Law Section, Florida
Bar, final draft), in FLA. B.-HE L.T L. SEc. NEWSL. (Fla. Bar, Tallahassee, Fla.), Nov./Dec.
1991, at 1. See also Letter from R. Andrew Rock, Chairman, The Florida Bar Health Law
Section, to Rep. Elaine Bloom (Oct. 31, 1991) (proposal for legislation) (on file with Fla. H. R.
Comm. on Health Care).
413. "Terminal Condition" means:
(a) A condition caused by injury, disease, or illness from which within a reasonable
degree of medical certainty, there can be no recovery and which reasonably can be
expected to cause death; or
(b) A persistent vegetative state characterized by a permanent and irreversible condi-
tion of unconsciousness in which, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty,
there is:
1. The absence of voluntary action or cognitive behavior of any kind; and
2. An inability to communicate or interact purposefully with the environment.
Fla. CS to CS for SB 1096 & SB 2414, § 3 (1992).
414. See supra note 411.
415. Representative Arnold offered an amendment that defined "terminal condition" as "a
condition caused by injury, disease or illness from which, to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, there can be no recovery and which makes death inevitable." FLA. H.R. Joua. 181
(Reg. Sess. 1992). This definition was flawed because life itself is a condition that will inevitably
result in death.
416. FLA. H.R. Joit. 608 (Reg. Sess. 1992). See supra note 413 for Senate definition.
417. Cosgrove was a member of the Study Commission that earlier examined Florida's
guardianship statues. See supra note 246.
419. FLA. S. JouR. 878 (Reg. Sess. 1992). This primarily involved the substitution of "no
reasonable probability of recovery" for "reasonable degree of medical certainty." See supra
note 407.
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"terminal condition," 419 a subsequent amendment by Senator Dudley,
inserting "without treatment, " was adopted 420 and included in the bill
signed by the Governor. The definition of "terminal condition" now
means a condition ". . . from which there is no reasonable probability
of recovery and which, without treatment, can be expected to cause
death .... -42 This definition is broader than the House version,
which was tied to conditions that would result in death following the
withholding or withdrawal of life-prolonging types of treatment rather
than simply treatment.422
Before the final amendment, the proposed transfer provision or
''conscience clause" of the proposed committee bill was similar to
House Bill 1039 (1991). It permitted a health care provider to transfer
a patient and to pay the cost of transfer, but it ultimately required the
provider to carry out the wishes of the patient if transfer efforts
failed.4 23 This was not satisfactory to the Florida Catholic Conference,
which wanted more consideration to be given to the policies of the
provider or facility. As before, this was based on the provision in the
Federal Patient Self-Determination Act that allowed accommodation
to differing state policies on this issue. 4 4 To accommodate these con-
cerns, a different version was incorporated into House Bill 1851 that
419. FLA. S. JOUR. 882 (Reg. Sess. 1992).
420. Id. at 900.
421. The definition now reads:
"Terminal condition" means:
(a) A condition caused by injury, disease, or illness from which there is no reasona-
ble probability of recovery and which, without treatment, can be expected to cause
death; or
(b) A persistent vegetative state characterized by a permanent and irreversible condi-
tion of unconsciousness in which there is:
1. The absence of voluntary action or cognitive behavior of any kind; and
2. An inability to communicate or interact purposefully with the environment.
Ch. 92-199, § 2, 1992 Fla. Laws 1839 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 765.101(17)).
This is the opposite of the early definitions of terminal condition that defined terminal condi-
tion to mean conditions where death would result regardless of treatment. See supra notes 29
and 89.
422. Fla. HB 1851 (1992).
423.
If a health care provider or health care facility cannot carry out the wishes of the
declarant in accordance with this chapter, the provider or the facility shall make rea-
sonable efforts to transfer the declarant to another health care provider or health care
facility. If all reasonable efforts to provide for transfer fail, the health care provider
shall carry out the wishes of the declarant. All expenses directly relating to such trans-
fer shall be borne by the health care provider or health care facility whose refusal to
comply with the declarant's wishes necessitates the transfer.
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health Care, PCB 92-01, § 18 (draft of Sept. 20, 1991).
424. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health Care, Subcomm. on Health Standards, tape recording of
proceedings (Sept. 12, 1991) (on file with comm.) (testimony of Tom Horkan, Fla. Catholic
Conference, discussing PCB 92-01).
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borrowed heavily from the Bar draft version. The Bar version did not
require the physician or facility to carry out the wishes of the patient
as long as the patient was not in an emergency situation and had re-
ceived prior notice of the facility's policies, and did not require the
provider or facility to pay the costs of transfer. 425 While the House
version acknowledged the moral and ethical beliefs of a physician or
facility, it still required the facility to carry out the patient's wishes if
the patient had not been transferred within seven days. However, the
facility was not required to pay the costs of transfer if the patient had
been advised of the facility's policies prior to admission and the pa-
tient had had the opportunity to select another physician or facility.
416
425.
An attending or treating physician who refuses to comply with the declaration of a
qualified patient or the treatment decision of a surrogate under this chapter or any
other person lawfully authorized to make such decisions, shall make a reasonable ef-
fort to transfer the patient to another physician or health care facility. Nothing con-
tained in this chapter is intended to require any health care provider or facility to
commit any act which is contrary to his moral or ethical beliefs concerning life-pro-
longing procedures, providing the patient
(a) is not in an emergency condition, and
(b) has received the written information upon admission informing the patient of
the written policies of the provider or facility regarding such moral or ethical beliefs.
(2) A health care provider or facility unable to carry out the wishes of the patient
because of such moral or ethical beliefs shall make every reasonable effort to transfer
the patient to another provider or facility, or may bring an expedited judicial interven-
tion concerning life-prolonging procedures under the Florida Probate Rules. Nothing
herein shall be construed to require a provider or facility to bear the costs of transfer
or an expedited judicial intervention.
Proposed Amendments to Life-Prolonging Procedures Act, § 11 (Health Law Section, Florida
Bar, ifnal draft) in 3 FLA. B.-HEALrT L. SEC. NEwsL. (Fla. Bar, Tallahassee, Fla.), Nov./Dec.
1991, at 1. See also Letter from R. Andrew Rock, Chairman, The Florida Bar Health Law
Section, to Rep. Elaine Bloom (Oct. 31, 1991) (proposal for legislation) (on file with Fla. H. R.
Comm. on Health Care).
426.
(1) Nothing contained in this chapter is intended to require any physician or health
care facility, or other person who acts under the direction of a physician or health care
facility, to commit any act which is contrary to his or her moral or ethical beliefs
concerning life-prolonging procedures, provided that prior to or upon admission of
the patient to a health care facility:
(a) The patient or surrogate received information in writing, informing the patient of
the policies of the physician or health care facility regarding such moral or ethical
beliefs; and
(b) The patient or surrogate had the opportunity to select another physician or health
care facility.
(2) An attending physician or health care facility which because of moral or ethical
beliefs who refuses to comply with the declaration of a patient made pursuant to s.
765.04, or the treatment decision of a surrogate lawfully authorized to make such
decisions, shall make a reasonable effort to transfer the patient to another physician
or health care facility.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to require a physician or health care
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As in the definition of terminal condition, a modified Senate version
ultimately prevailed. 42 7
It will be recalled that there was ambiguity over the grounds upon
which a physician or facility could refuse to carry out instructions to
withhold life-prolonging procedures. 42 Representative Keith Arnold
offered a floor amendment to the "conscience clause" which would
have permitted an "expedited judicial proceeding" to temporarily
stall the requirement that the decision to forego treatment be carried
out within seven days if transfer arrangements failed. 4 9 This essen-
tially meant that every time a provider objected to carrying out a pa-
tient's instructions the provider had recourse to judicial intervention.
A substitute amendment, which prevailed, put judicial intervention
back into the role envisioned by the Browning court by permitting an
expedited proceeding only if the provisions of section 765.0702 ap-
plied. 430 Section 765.0702 basically permitted any interested party to
judicially challenge the treatment decision of a surrogate only if the
surrogate's decision was not in conformity with the requirements of
law.43 1
When Senator Malchon's floor amendment to House Bill 1851 sub-
stituted the Senate version of the "conscience clause" for the House's
version, it did not contain the provision restricting judicial interven-
facility to bear the costs of transfer, provided that the patient was informed of the
policies of the physician or health care facility concerning moral or ethical beliefs re-
garding the administration of life-prolonging procedures and the patient or surrogate
had a reasonable opportunity to select another physician or health care facility.
(4) If the patient has not been transferred within 7 days following the surrogate's deci-
sion to withdraw or withhold life-prolonging procedures, the attending physician or
the health care facility shall carry out the wishes of the patient or surrogate.
Fla. HB 1851, §13 (1992).
It was believed that the requirement that the patient have the opportunity to select another
facility would cover both emergency situations and situations where, given a particular geo-
graphic area, there was no real choice in selecting a facility.
427. Ch. 92-199, § 4, 1992 Fla. Laws 1839, 1849-50 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 765.308).
428. See supra notes 381-83 and accompanying text.
429. FLA. H.R. Joua. 180 (Reg. Sess. 1992). The sentence in House Bill 1851, § 13 would
have read:
(4) If the patient has not been transferred within 7 days following the surrogate's decision to
withdraw or withhold life-prolonging procedures, and no expedited judicial proceeding has been
instituted to review the matter, then the attending physician or the health care facility shall carry
out the wishes of the patient or surrogate. Id.
430. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 180 (Reg. Sess. 1992). The subsection now read:
(4) If the patient has not been transferred within 7 days following the surrogate's decision to
withdraw or withhold life-prolonging procedures, the attending physician or the health care fa-
cility shall carry out the wishes of the patient or surrogate unless the provisions of s. 765.0702
apply.
Section 765.0702 of House Bill 1851 became § 765.105 of House Bill 1851 (First Engrossed).
431. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 180 (Reg. Sess. 1992).
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tion to statutory violations.43 2 A last-minute amendment corrected
this. 433 Unfortunately, the Senate substitute did not correct for differ-
ences in terminology between the House and Senate bills. Alas, while
the House bill's conscience clause spoke to the beliefs of both physi-
cians and facilities, the Senate bill spoke only to health care providers.
While the Senate definition for health care providers included both
physicians and facilities, the House bill's definition for provider
meant only persons, not facilities.43 4 Facilities thus were no longer
covered by the transfer clause, a result no one desired. Representative
Bloom attempted to call attention to the inadvertent nature of the er-
ror by reading into the record of the House a statement clarifying leg-
islative intent to apply this provision to both persons and facilities. 435
A final major source of controversy involved chapter 765's prohibi-
tion against the withdrawal of life-prolonging procedures from a preg-
nant patient. 4 6 This provision had been interpreted to mean that an
incompetent, terminally ill pregnant patient had fewer rights than a
competent, terminally ill pregnant patient who could, at least before
viability, choose to refuse medical treatment. 47 Upon second reading,
Representative Guber successfully offered amendments removing
those provisions from House Bill 1851.48 The "Advance Directives"
floor amendment to House Bill 1851, which rewrote chapter 765, did
not include the pregnancy restriction. It also deleted restrictions on
the surrogate's ability to provide consent for abortion, sterilization,
electroshock treatment, psychosurgery, and experimental treatments
which have not been recommended by a federally approved institu-
432. FLA. S. JOUR. 881 (Reg. Sess. 1992).
433. Id. at 882.
434. "'Health care provider' or 'provider' means any person licensed, certified, or otherwise
authorized by law to administer health care in the ordinary course of business or practice of a
profession." Ch. 92-199, § 2, 1992 Fla. Laws 1839, 1840. The Senate bill, on the other hand,
defined a health care provider to include both persons and facilities. Fla. CS for CS for SB 1096
& SB 2414, § 3 (1992).
435. FLA. H.R. JOUR.'151-52 (Spec. Sess. E 1992).
436. "The declaration of a qualified patient, or the written agreement for a patient qualified
under s. 765.07, which patient has been diagnosed as pregnant by the attending physician, shall
have no effect during the course of the pregnancy." FLA. STAT. § 765.08 (1991).
The declaration form also contained the provision: "If I have been diagnosed as pregnant and
that diagnosis is known to my physician, this declaration shall have no force or effect during the
course of my pregnancy." Id. § 765.05.
Both provisions had been part of chapter 756 since its creation in 1984.
437. This issue has been festering since Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and is potentially
even more compelling since the Florida Supreme Court's decision in In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186
(Fla. 1989). See Stratos, supra note 106, at 175.
438. FLA. H.R. JouR. 182 (Reg. Sess. 1992) (one amendment was left pending in order to
keep the bill on unfinished business so that the redrafted "advance directives" version of House
Bill 1851 could be amended onto the bill).
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tional review board.439 Attempts to reinsert a modified form of those
restrictions plus the pregnancy prohibition were unsuccessful on the
House floor,' ° but were amended onto the Senate amendment to the
House bill." 1 The Senate version reinserted the prior restrictions but
permitted them to be overcome upon the express instructions of the
patient. Upon reconsideration, the House approved a modification of
this provision to permit court intervention as well as the patient's ex-
press instructions.4 2
In addition to these more controversial sections, House Bill 1851
also contained the evidentiary presumptions suggested by the Brown-
ing court. Thus, presumptions of clear and convincing evidence were
attached to a written declaration,443 a written designation of a health
439. Cf. FLA. STAT. § 745.46 (1991) (denying a surrogate this authority). The restriction for-
bidding a health care surrogate to provide consent for the withholding or withdrawal of life-
prolonging procedures was also eliminated but this was not contested because the Browning deci-
sion made clear that a surrogate could have this authority.
Note that § 744.3215(4), Florida Statutes (1991), prevents a guardian from consenting to these
same procedures without first obtaining court approval.
440. FLA. H.R. Joun. 608 (Reg. Sess. 1992). The proposed insertions were proposed as fol-
lows:
Section 765.113 Restrictions on surrogate providing consent. - Unless the principal
expressly delegates such authority to the surrogate in writing, a surrogate or proxy
may not provide consent for abortion, sterilization, electroshock therapy, psychosur-
gery, experimental treatments or therapy, or voluntary admission to a mental health
facility.
Section 765.114 Pregnancy. - A health care provider treating or caring for a patient
who is diagnosed as pregnant shall not honor any consents or instructions related to
withholding or withdrawing life-prolonging procedures while the pregnancy continues,
unless done before viability as defined in s. 340.001(5), and unless the patient has
expressly authorized such withholding or withdrawal.
Id.
441. FLA. S. Joui. 882 (Reg. Sess. 1992). The language was identical to the proposed House
amendment. See supra note 410.
442. FLA. H.R. JoUR. 1828 (Reg. Sess. 1992). The following language was inserted:
Section 765.113 Restrictions on providing consent. - Unless the principal expressly
delegates such authority to the surrogate in writing, or a surrogate or proxy has sought
and received court approval pursuant to rule 5.900 of the Florida Probate Rules, a
surrogate or proxy may not provide consent for:
(1) Abortion, sterilization, electroshock therapy, psychosurgery, experimental treat-
ments that have not been recommended by a federally approved institutional review
board in accordance with 45 C.F.R., part 46, or voluntary admission to a mental
health facility.
(2) Withholding or withdrawing life-prolonging procedures from a pregnant patient
prior to viability as defined in s. 390.001(5).
Following Senate concurrence to this amendment, the bill had passed both houses of the legis-
lature. FLA. S. JosR. 1743 (Reg. Sess. 1992); FLA. H.R. JouR. 1828 (Reg. Sess. 1992); FLA. S.
JOUR. 1809 (Reg. Sess. 1992).
443. Fla. HB 1851, § 4 (1992), Ch. 92-199, § 4, 1992 Fla. Laws 1839, 1847 (to be codified at
FLA. STAT. § 765.302(3)).
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care surrogate, 4" and the sworn physician statements certifying a pa-
tient's condition." 5 This last provision was modified in response to
pressures to reduce the requirement that physicians provide sworn
statements. 4"6 The provision now assigns the rebuttable presumption
to the physicians' signed documentation in the patient's medical rec-
ord. 447 As in 1991, the decision was again made to require two-in-
stead of three-physicians to certify the patient's condition. 448 In
addition, the Browning"9 requirement that the consulting physicians
have a specialty relevant to the patient's condition was also dropped
because this was also seen as both costly and burdensome to the facil-
ity as well as to the family.
450
More significantly, the bill tried to incorporate the surrogacy proce-
dure that was required by both the Bludworth and Browning courts.4 15
In those decisions, the court required that there be a decision maker to
be sure that the conditions set forth by the patient had dccurred, in-
suring that the patient's wishes were being carried out.4 2 The surro-
gate was, in effect, the executor of the patient's living "will." In the
absence of an express designation by the patient, or prior appointment
of a guardian, the court permitted a surrogate to be selected from the
patient's family or close friends to carry out a patient's written or oral
declaration, or for a designated surrogate to make the decision if so
instructed by the patient. 4 5 In the absence of family or friends, the
bill required a court-appointed guardian to make the decision. This
statutory scheme was strongly opposed by both the Florida Hospital
444. Id. § 3 (1992), Ch. 92-199, § 3, 1992 Fla. Laws at 1844 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
765.202(6)).
445. Id. § 3 (1992), Ch. 92-199, §3, 1992 Fla. Laws at 1846 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
765.204(2)).
446. See, e.g., Letter to Representative Elaine Bloom from Mary E. Early, Director of Pub-
lic Policy, Florida Association of Homes for the Aging (Mar. 5, 1992) ("The House bill also
requires physicians to provide a sworn statement regarding the medical condition of a patient.
Given concern over liability, this requirement will probably make it more difficult for a nursing
home or hospital to execute a patient's living will."); Letter to Senators Grant, Dudley, Langley,
Malchon, and Weinstein, from R. Andrew Rock, Health Law Section of The Florida Bar (Mar.
4, 1992) (proposing that the findings of the physicians be documented in the patient's record).
447. Ch. 92-199, § 4, 1992 Fla. Laws 1839, 1849 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 765.306(2)).
448. Fla. HB 1851, § 3 (1992), Ch. 92-199, § 3, 1992 Fla. Laws 1839, 1846 (to be codified at
FLA. STAT. § 765.204(3)). See supra note 145.
449. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 16 (Fla. 1990).
450. Ch. 92-199, § 4, 1992 Fla. Laws 1839, 1849 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. 765.306(1)).
This was altered in the Senate amendment to the House bill. FLA. S. JouR. 881 (Reg. Sess. 1992).
See also letters cited supra note 446.
451. See Fla. HB 1851, §§ 7, 8 (1992), Ch. 92-199, §§ 7, 8, 1992 Fla. Laws 1839, 1851-52 (to
be codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 744.345, 709.08).
452. See supra notes 332-36 and accompanying text.
453. See supra notes 332-36 and accompanying text.
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Association and the Health Law Section of The Florida Bar, which
preferred the arrangement in the original statute that left unsaid who
was to interpret the provisions of a person's living will. 4 4 In other
words, if a patient had executed a living will but had not designated a
surrogate to carry out the instructions contained within the declara-
tion, the facility could carry out the instruction without seeking the
designation of a surrogate. 4"1
This position was seen as presenting several problems. First, it es-
sentially made the health care provider or facility the decision maker,
because the provider or facility, instead of the family, friend, or
guardian, would be determining whether the conditions stated in the
declaration exist. Further, as decision maker, the provider or facility
had a potential conflict of interest. 4 6 On the one hand, if the patient
was indigent and expensive, there is no question that it would be to
the hospital's advantage to conclude, perhaps prematurely, that the
patient was terminal. On the other hand, a wealthy patient could be
seen as financially profitable to the facility. Second, there would be
no requirement for the facility to defer to or even consult with the
patient's family. The ability of a hospital or other facility to bypass
the family was inherently offensive.
Arguments that a surrogate could unconstitutionally come between
the patient and his instructions as expressed in a living will were over-
come by the fact that the surrogate was obligated under the doctrine
of substituted judgment to carry out the patient's wishes. 45 This doc-
trine was incorporated by the statute's requirement that the surrogate
was obligated to see to it that "[b]efore proceeding in accordance with
the principal's living will, the surrogate or proxy must be satisfied
that: . . . any limitations or conditions expressed orally or in a written
declaration have been carefully considered and satisfied. "458 In addi-
tion, the failure to follow the patient's instruction was grounds for a
454. See Letter from Rock, supra note 446 (stating that a living will must be "self-execut-
ing").
455. The Florida Bar's proposal stated that:
The failure of an adult patient who has executed a declaration to designate a surrogate
to carry out his wishes concerning life-prolonging procedures shall not affect the dec-
laration. Life-prolonging procedures may be withheld or withdrawn as directed by a
declarant in a declaration regardless of whether a surrogate has been designated.
Final Draft, Florida Bar, Health Law Section, § 28.
456. Note the Study Commission on Guardianship Law recommended that a guardian not be
the health care provider to the ward unless the court specifically finds that there is no conflict of
interest. STUDY COMMISSION ON GUARDIANsHiP LAW, ST404 COMilISSION ON GuARDLANsHIP LAW,
RPOnRT AND RECOMNDATIONS OF THE STUDY COMMISSION ON GUARDAsmp LAW 33 (Mar. 1,
1989).
457. See supra notes 332-36 and accompanying text for discussion of substituted judgments.
458. Ch. 92-199, § 4, 1992 Fla. Laws 1839, 1847 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 765.304(2)).
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legal challenge under section 765.105. 419 A compromise was struck
permitting the facility to assume the role of decision maker if no one
else was available.46
A section was also created within part III that outlined the proce-
dure a designated surrogate was to follow in the absence of a living
will. The Browning decision had been somewhat unclear as to whether
or not the surrogate/proxy must be directly instructed to make the
decision to withhold medical treatment in terminal situations or
whether he could make this decision if he had simply been designated
to make all health care decisions. 4"' The new Act assumed the latter,
unless the patient expressly directed otherwise. 62
The health care surrogacy section was essentially a streamlining of
chapter 745 with an emphasis placed on permitting the health care sur-
rogate to make all health care decisions unless expressly instructed
otherwise.43 The restrictions on who could serve as a surrogate were
eliminated,"4 as was the requirement that the patient's competency be
reviewed every thirty days,45 and that a surrogacy designation auto-
matically expires after seven years (unless the patient was incapable of
giving informed consent at the time of expiration). 46 Added was a
459. Id. § 2, 1992 Fla. Laws at 1839 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 765.105).
460. Id. § 4, 1992 Fla. Laws at 1847 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 765.304(1)). This still
does not overcome the potential conflict of interest on the part of the facility.
461. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 15 (Fla. 1990). While the text of the
opinion implies that the surrogate was to be given a specific instruction to make the decision to
forgo further medical treatment, footnote 14's reference to Justice O'Connor's opinion in Cru-
zan suggests otherwise. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2857
(1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Frankly, it is illogical to imagine that a person would specifi-
cally delegate to another the authority to decide whether or not to withhold medical treatment in
terminal situations without also expressing whether they would want such treatment adminis-
tered. It is far more likely that a person would simply delegate to a trusted other the authority to
make all health care decisions with the additional instruction that should the person be perma-
nently incapacitated, no additional efforts are to be employed.
462. Ch. 92-199, § 4, 1992 Fla. Laws 1839, 1847 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 765.305(1)).
463. "The surrogate shall: Have authority to act for the principal and to make all health care
decisions for the principal in matters regarding the principal's health care during the principal's
incapacity, in accordance with the principal's instructions, unless such authority has been ex-
pressly limited by the principal." Id. § 3, 1992 Fla. Laws at 1844 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
765.205(l)(a)).
This policy was somewhat compromised by the inclusion of the section which directed that a
health care surrogate could not consent to abortion, sterilization, electroshock therapy, psycho-
surgery, experimental treatments, or consent to the withholding of life-support from pregnant
patients. Id. § 2, 1992 Fla. Laws at 1844 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 765.113).
464. Former FLA. STAT. § 745.42(5) (1991).
465. Former FLA. STAT. § 745.48(2) (1991).
466. Former FLA. STAT. § 745.49 (1991). Cf. ch. 92-199, § 3, 1992 Fla. Laws 1839, 1845 (to
be codified at FLA. STAT. § 765.202(5)) (providing that a designation remains in effect unless
revoked).
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provision permitting the designation of an alternate surrogate, 467 and a
suggested form for the written designation of a surrogate." Although
Representative Simone's bill and the Bar Draft originally intended to
drop the health care surrogacy format and create a durable power of
attorney for health care, it remained in the surrogacy form for the
same reasons that chapter 745 had been cast in a surrogacy format-
to avoid the possible impression that a person would have to seek le-
gal assistance in drafting a durable power of attorney for health care.
Most importantly, section 709.08, Florida Statutes, was amended to
direct that a durable power of attorney with authority to make health
care decisions was regulated by the new revised chapter 765.49
Some of the conflicts with guardianship law were also addressed.
Chapter 745 had permitted a designated surrogate's authority to con-
tinue after the court appointment of a guardian of the patient's estate
unless the court removes such power; 4 0 this provision is still within
the surrogacy sections. 47' In addition, chapter 744 was amended to di-
rect a court, upon the appointment of a guardian, to address the issue
of any pre-existing advance directives of the ward, the continued ef-
fect of those directives, and the authority of a guardian to act on be-
half of a ward with respect to those directives. 472
Probably the most innovative and yet potentially the most problem-
atic provision in the new law is part IV, which provides a procedure
for the appointment of a proxy to make health care decisions for an
incapacitated patient in the absence of an advance directive.43 This
section originated as a blend of sections 745.44(2) and 765.07, Florida
Statutes. Section 745.44(2) permitted a health care facility to appoint
a surrogate when one had not been designated by the patient. The
facility was obligated to follow a certain order in the selection: a
guardian if one had been appointed, the patient's spouse, the patient's
adult child, or the patient's parent. If none were available the facility,
was to petition the court to appoint a guardian. As suggested be-
fore, 47 4 this was outside the legal framework of a durable power of
attorney which served only to provide a procedure for a competent
467. Ch. 92-199, § 3, 1992 Fla. Laws 1839, 1844-45 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 765.202).
468. Id. § 3, 1992 Fla. Laws at 1845 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 765.203).
469. Id. § 8, 1992 Fla. Laws at 1852 (to be codified at FLA. STAT., § 709.08).
470. Former FLA. STAT. § 745.45 (3) (1991).
471. Ch. 92-199, § 3, 1992 Fla. Laws 1839, 1847 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 765.205(3)).
472. Id. §§ 6, 7, 1992 Fla. Laws at 1851 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 744.3115, .345). Still
unresolved is the relationship between a plenary guardian and a surrogate unless one assumes
that plenary guardianship usurps surrogacy. If so, does this unconstitutionally nullify a person's
privacy right to direct medical treatment through his expressly designated surrogate?
473. Id. § 5, 1992 Fla. Laws at 1850-51 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 765.401).
474. See supra notes 256-57 and accompanying text.
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person to designate an agent during times of incapacity. Where none
had been appointed, guardianship was to take over. Thus, this section
permitted a facility to avoid a court procedure seeking an appointed
guardian in the area of health care decision making when one had not
been designated by the patient.
Section 765.07, Florida Statutes, permitted the decision to withhold
life-prolonging procedures from a terminally ill, incompetent, adult
patient who had not executed a living will, to be made by another
individual in consultation with the patient's physician.475 The decision
makers were to be guided by the express or implied intentions of the
patient.
While the Browning court had focused exclusively on medical deci-
sion making for permanently incapacitated individuals, the advance
directives bill also wanted to address the appointment of substitute
decision makers for temporarily incapacitated patients. Consequently,
part III of the Act, relating to life-prolonging procedures, only pro-
vides a procedure for executing and effectuating written living wills.476
The evidentiary burden and procedure for effectuating oral instruc-
tions is left to part IV, as well as a means for appointing a proxy
decision maker to make health care decisions in the absence of an ex-
press designation. 47 7 The creation of a procedure allowing the appoint-
ment of another, who is outside court supervision, to make health
care decisions for an incapacitated patient, who has neither left in-
structions nor personally selected a surrogate, is a powerful privilege
and should be examined more closely.
In addition to the above, a section permitting emergency medical
service personnel to honor a "do-not-resuscitate" order was incorpo-
rated into the bill since such an order also represented a form of "ad-
vance directive. ' 478 This section, added as an amendment by
Representative Mary Brennan, 479 probably has made more people
475. The individual was to be selected in the following order of priority: a guardian if one
has been appointed, a designated surrogate, the patient's spouse, the patient's adult children, the
patient's parents, or the patient's nearest living relative. This section was to operate when the
patient had not executed a written declaration but had left other evidence of his wishes concern-
ing the administration of life-support. FLA. STAT. § 765.07 (Supp. 1984).
476. Fla. HB 1851 § 4 (1992).
477. Id. § 5.
478. Ch. 92-199, § 4, 1992 Fla. Laws 1839, 1849 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 765.307). A
similar provision was also incorporated into Senate Bill 294, a rewrite of chapter 401, which
passed as chapter 92-78, 1992 Florida Laws 713, 735-36 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 401.45).
Chapter 401 regulates emergency medical technicians and paramedics.
479. See FLA. H.R. JouR. 182 (Reg. Sess. 1992). The amendment was rewritten for the latter
version of House Bill 1851.
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happy than any other provision. 4 0 The new "expedited judicial pro-
ceeding," requested by the Florida Supreme Court in Browning and
promulgated as Florida Probate Rule 5.900, was incorporated into
new section 765.1054 1 which created a procedure for judicially
reviewing the decision of surrogates or proxies. Finally, the federal
requirements mandated by the Patient Self-Determination Act were
incorporated into section 765.1 10.4 2 For better or ill, everything that
anybody could think of was now contained within chapter 765.
VI. CONCLUSION
Changing the way people think about things is always a difficult
and painful process. The more fundamental the concepts, the more
troublesome the transition. Few things are more basic than the preser-
vation of life, yet this single subject has been subject to more attack in
recent times than any other-chiefly as the result of rapid technologi-
cal advancement. Generally, scientific effort is aimed toward the pro-
longation of life, an end desired by almost everyone. It is hardly
surprising then that efforts to put on some restrictions should be met
with a surprised and stubborn resistance. However, it has become in-
creasingly obvious that the empty and undignified existence of a
Karen Ann Quinlan, a Nancy Cruzan, or an Estelle Browning was not
what anyone intended in the effort to extend life expectancy.
The 1992 Act and the Browning decision are inconsistent. The Flor-
ida Supreme Court has construed the state constitution's article I, sec-
tion 23 "right of privacy" to encompass an individual's authority to
approve all health care unless the state is able to demonstrate a com-
pelling interest that overcomes that right. That right does not sud-
denly evaporate upon a person's incompetency but continues
unabated. Indeed, it would be an empty right if it did not apply to
perhaps the most significant medical decision that a person may face.
It then recognizes that for many, the end is not necessarily when death
is imminent but when the individual has lost all physical and mental
capacity and has become a hopeless burden on those around them and
bearing little resemblance to the person they want remembered. The
court therefore held that the person may make arrangements to direct
the course of his or her medical care by leaving specific instructions
which are to be carried out by another or by appointing another to
make decisions for him or her during his or her incapacity. The source
480. Unfortunately, this section is being interpreted to also apply to do-not-resuscitate orders
within hospitals.
481. Ch. 92-199, § 2, 1992 Fla. Laws 1839, 1842-43 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 765.105).
482. Id. § 2, 1992 Fla. Laws at 1843-44 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 765.110).
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of those instructions must be the individual, and the instructions must
control the medical decision that the substitute decision maker makes
on the individual's behalf.
While the new Act also recognizes a fundamental right of self-deter-
mination regarding decisions pertaining to one's own health, it is re-
stricted to permitting the removal of life-prolonging procedures from
terminally ill patients. In the past, the courts were able to avoid hold-
ing the statute unconstitutional by activating section 765.15, Florida
Statutes (Supp. 1984)," 3 which provided that the life-prolonging pro-
cedures provision was cumulative to the existing law, not impairing
existing rights which a person may have under the laws of the state.
That provision was also incorporated into the 1992 Act.4 In addition,
the new Act contains a provision declaring that the chapter "shall not
be construed to render unlawful any form of substitute decisionmak-
ing recognized either by the constitutional right of privacy or any
other provision of the State or United States Constitutions."
5
As explained by the Second District in Corbett when it activated the
"cumulative" provision in section 765.15, Florida Statutes (Supp.
1984), to permit the withholding of sustenance from a terminally ill
patient, "chapter 765 appears to have been enacted to apply in certain
specified situations and was not intended to encompass the entire
spectrum of instances in which these privacy rights may be exer-
cised. ' 4 6 Is that how the new Act should continue to be interpreted?
In reviewing those cases where the courts applied the "cumulative"
provision and avoided declaring the statute unconstitutional, it would
483. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 265 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
aff'd, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990); Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. 2d DCA
1986). See also Browning, 568 So. 2d at 9 (Florida Supreme Court simply held that chapter 765
did not apply to Mrs. Browning's situation).
484. Ch. 92-199, § 2, 1992 Fla. Laws 1839, 1843 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 765.106).
The Act says:
The provisions of this chapter are cumulative to the existing law regarding an indivi-
dual's right to consent, or refuse to consent, to medical treatment and do not impair
any existing rights or responsibilities which a health care provider, including a minor,
competent or incompetent person, or a patient's family may have in regard to the
withholding or withdrawal of life-prolonging procedures or any other health care deci-
sionmaking under the common law or statutes of this state.
Id.
485. Id., 1992 Fla. Laws at 1844 (to be codified at FIA. STAT. § 765.111). The Act says:
This chapter shall not be construed to render unlawful any form of substitute deci-
sionmaking recognized either by the constitutional right of privacy or any other provi-
sion of the State or United States Constitution. To the extent such other forms of
surrogate decisionmaking are recognized under constitutional law, they shall be
deemed an alternative to this chapter.
Id.
486. Corbett, 487 So. 2d at 370.
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appear that in all cases the courts were applying the statute to situa-
tions that had not been addressed before. Thus, before Corbett, the
Florida Supreme Court had not specifically addressed the nature of
the medical procedures that could be refused. Similarly, before
Browning, Bludworth had been restricted to the withdrawal of life-
prolonging procedures from incompetent patients certified to be in a
permanent vegetative state. Logically, then, our statute would not be
unconstitutional to the extent that it fails to accommodate situations
that have not yet been addressed by the courts. In such situations, new
sections 765.106 and 765.111 could operate. However, to the extent
that the new Act is seen as restricting rights expressly recognized it
could be seen as unconstitutional.
Without question, the new Advance Directives Act is an important
achievement. Although some provisions, particularly those that are
the most innovative, remain rough and in need of further refinement,
on the whole, it is a significant attempt to provide a comprehensive
approach to personal health care planning. From this perspective, the
new Act represents increased recognition for the individual's right to
maintain control over medical care during times of incapacity. Of spe-
cial interest is the emerging role of health care surrogacy decisions.
Although not yet fully developed, it is anticipated that this new, le-
gally based and more flexible form of advance directive will gradually
replace living wills, which will come to be seen as no more than a
special set of instructions to a designated surrogate. Hopefully, Flor-
ida can remain in the forefront of this important trend.
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